Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 279891; Published
Judges Jansen, Hoekstra, and Markey; Unanimous, Per Curium
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 284 Mich App 581; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Allowable Expenses for Handicapper Motor Vehicles [§3107(1)(a)]
Allowable Expenses: Causation Requirement [§3107(1)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s consent judgment that required the Defendants pay the full cost for the plaintiff’s 2005 Pontiac Montana minivan as an allowable expense benefit under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for summary disposition regarding the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy-trespass, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, on the basis of res judicata.\
With respect to the consent judgment regarding the purchase of the minivan, while the defendants consented to the judgment, the defendants preserved all arguments regarding their responsibility to pay the full cost of the minivan and under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Accordingly, the defendants were ultimately able to appeal this issue. The complicated procedural history is provided in the opinion.
However, by entering into the consent judgment, as well as not properly raising the issues on appeal, the defendants were not allowed by the Court of Appeals to contest whether the purchase price for the minivan was a “reasonable charge” and whether the van was “reasonably necessary” for the plaintiff’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation, pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
After explaining that it did not have to address the issues of reasonable charge or reasonable necessity, the court addressed the defendants’ argument that under Griffith, the defendants were not responsible for the purchase of the van, because it was not “for accidental bodily injury” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), nor was the van for an injured person’s care or rehabilitation under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the defendants’ argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Griffith v State Farm ultimately meant that the defendants were liable to pay the cost to modify the plaintiff’s minivan, but not the cost of the van itself.
In rejecting the defendants’ argument regarding the causation analysis under Griffith, the court noted that while the Griffith decision clarified the judicial construction of both MCL 500.3107(1) and MCL 500.3107(1)(a) to determine whether a particular expense can be claimed as an allowable expense benefit, the Supreme Court in Griffith did not overrule the Court of Appeal’s decision in Davis v. Citizens wherein the Court of Appeals held that the no-fault insurer was ultimately responsible for the full cost of the injured person’s handicapped accessible van and not simply the cost of the modifications to the van. Accordingly, the court held that “[b]ecause the Griffith court did not overrule Davis, and because Davis was issued on or after November 1, 1990, the Davis decision is binding presidential authority…”
The court further explained that it was rejecting the defendants’ bright-line rule that if an injured person uses a product, service, or accommodation both before and after a motor vehicle accident, the product, service, or accommodation cannot satisfy the causal relationship test established in Griffith. The court recognized that while Griffith held that the injured person’s need for food at his own home was not causally connected to his care, recovery, or rehabilitation, the food furnished to the injured person in an institutional setting would meet the causal relationship for allowable expense benefits under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). In this regard the court specifically stated:
“Moreover, we reject defendants’ bright-line rule that if an injured person uses a product, service or accommodation both before and after their motor vehicle accident, it cannot for that reason meet the statutory causal relationship tests clarified in Griffith for an “allowable expense” no fault benefit. Rather, the Griffith Court held that a product, service or accommodation an injured person uses both before and after a motor vehicle accident might be an “allowable expense” no fault benefit depending on the particular facts and circumstances involved. Just as the Court was careful to parse the words of the statute in the context of their use, Griffith, supra at 533-535, so too the context in which a product, service or accommodation is used is key when considering whether it is an allowable expense under the no fault act. Thus, in Griffith, the injured person’s need for food at his own home was not an allowable expense because it was neither causally related to the accident under MCL 500.3105(1) nor necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Nonetheless, the Court observed that food furnished to an injured person in an institutional setting could meet the statutory criteria of an allowable no fault expense.”
The court further explained its analysis regarding the Griffith decision by noting that the decision explicitly recognized that in a situation where a person needs special shoes, due to motor vehicle accident related injuries, the no fault insurer would be responsible for the full cost of those special shoes, and not the marginal increase between the cost of the modified shoes versus normal shoes. In this regard, the court specifically explained:
“We also note that the >Griffith Court, when discussing the cost of food provided to an injured person in an institutional setting, did not suggest that only the marginal increase in the cost of such food served in an institutional setting would be an allowable expense. Nor did the Court suggest that only the marginal cost of modifying regular shoes would be a recoverable "allowable expense" under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Rather, in each example, the product, service, or accommodation used by the injured person before the accident is so blended with another product, service, or accommodation that the whole cost is an allowable expense if it satisfies the statutory criteria of being sufficiently related to motor vehicle accidental injuries and if it is a reasonable charge and reasonably necessary to the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The latter inquiry, of course, is factual and dependent on the circumstances each case.”
Based on the foregoing, the court ultimately held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that the van was causally connected to his accidental bodily injuries arising out of the subject motor vehicle accident, and, therefore, the defendants were responsible for the full cost of the van and the modifications thereto.
With respect to the plaintiff’s other causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy-trespass, breach of contract, promissory estoppel etc., the court held that the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for summary for summary disposition on these claims on the basis of res judicata and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. With respect to the issue of res judicata, the court recognized that the parties to this case were parties in a previous case, and, therefore, the plaintiff could have brought these causes of action in the previous litigation, but did not do so. Accordingly, under res judicata, the plaintiff was barred from bringing these claims in this cause of action. Furthermore, the court also explained why, with respect to the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim, the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court’s analysis of these issues is very much dependent upon the specific facts of this case, which are specifically explained in the court’s opinion.
