United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan; Case #05-CV-72886
Honorable Judge George Carem Steeh
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable, Opinion not Available 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Noneconomic Loss Liability for Serious Impairment of Body Function Threshold (Definition) [3135(1)]
Objective Manifestation of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
Determining Serious Impairment of Body Function As a Matter of Law [3135(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In an Opinion decided after the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Kreiner v Fischer [RB #2428] interpreting the statutory definition of serious impairment of body function, Judge George C. Steeh denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for non-economic losses, finding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that she may have sustained a serious impairment of body function.
Plaintiff in this case was diagnosed with costhochronditis, sternal clavicular joint problem and mild subluxation of her ribs, contusions of the abdomen, whiplash, and major depressive disorder with post-traumatic stress syndrome. Plaintiff was prescribed physical therapy for a six week period and again, for an additional four month period which she completed. About two years later, plaintiff returned to part-time employment. Earlier, she had been returned to work part-time with weight restrictions. However, her employer terminated her employment because it could not accommodate those restrictions. In denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Judge Steeh noted that defendant produced contradictory evidence regarding plaintiff’s injuries, her psychological impairment, and her ability to return to work. In this regard, Judge Steeh stated:
“The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. . . . In that light, the several medical reports and histories prepared by Plaintiff’s various doctors and independent examiners support materially different factual conclusions as to the effects her objectively manifested impairment of an important body function might have rendered on her ability to generally lead her normal life. The facts surrounding Plaintiff’s return to work and her diagnosis of major depressive disorder and posttraumatic stress syndrome are ambivalent to say the least. On the one hand, Plaintiff’s sworn deposition testimony is that she did not return to work until October 2005, . . . On the other hand, Dr. Stern’s records dating from February 2004 do appear to indicate that Plaintiff returned to work, or at least that she was medically cleared to do so, and Dr. Schroeder’s independent evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental state in April 2006 is authoritative in its own right, and indicative, at the least, of professional disagreement as to the proper diagnosis of Plaintiff’s contemporary psychological ailments. A reasonable person might find either of these conclusions to be appropriate, and these opposing conclusions as to the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries necessarily control the answer to the question of whether Plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function. The record also reflects additional and significant factual disputes among Plaintiff’s treating physicians as to the nature of her injury and the course of her treatment. . . . Here, a reasonable person might well disagree as to the conclusions regarding the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries to be drawn from the record the parties have prepared for this motion. This factual dispute is material to the determination of whether Plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law. Further factual development is necessary to flesh out the ambivalent medical narratives, and to evaluate the credibility of competing medical diagnoses.”
