Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 216519; Unpublished
Judges McDonald, Neff, and Fitzgerald; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [3106(1)]
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [3115(1)]
Determination of Involved Vehicle [3125]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
This unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion involves a priority dispute among three no-fault insurers. Plaintiff League General paid no-fault benefits to a person who was injured in an accident involving a vehicle driven by League General’s insured. League General sought to recover pro rata contribution from defendant State Farm and Michigan Millers who insured two (2) parked vehicles that were allegedly “involved in the accident.” Pro rata contribution is available under section 3115(1) only where the vehicles from whom contribution is sought were involved in the accident within the meaning of the No-Fault Act. The trial court found that the vehicles insured by defendants State Farm and Michigan Millers were not involved in the accident. In so holding, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in Turner v Auto Club Insurance Association [Item No. 1757] which concluded that, in order for a vehicle to be involved in the accident, the vehicle must be in use as a motor vehicle and must actively contribute to the happening of the accident. Although the Turner decision interrupted the phrase “involved in the accident” as that phrase in appears in section 3125, the court held that its reasoning is instructive here because the phrase should be construed uniformly throughout the No-Fault Act. Applying that rationale, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court properly determined that the two (2) vehicles insured by the defendants were parked at the time of the accident. The fact that the vehicles were parked “is relevant because injuries involved parked cars do not typically involve the motor vehicle in its use as a motor vehicle.” In this particular case, the two (2) parked vehicles were involved in a towing operation. The vehicle insured by defendant State Farm was placed in park while the driver removed a towing strap between that vehicle and the vehicle insured by defendant Michigan Millers. The Michigan Millers vehicle was also not moving at the time of the accident and thus should be considered parked. The court next examined whether or not the two (2) parked vehicles fell within any of the three (3) parked vehicle exceptions set forth in section 3106(1). The only exception which arguably applied was section 3106(1)(a), which refers to vehicles that are “parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.” This section applies only where “obstruction of traffic results in injury.” The court stated, “Because the evidence is clear that defendants’ insureds’ vehicles were not obstructing the roadway on which plaintiff’s insured’s vehicle was traveling, we agree with the trial court that defendants’ insureds’ vehicles were not unreasonably parked.” The court went on to say that even if the two (2) vehicles were not parked, or even if they were engaged in maintenance, summary disposition was properly granted because the two stationary vehicles “did not actively contribute to this accident. The presence of these vehicles at the scene of the accident does not constitute involvement in the accident in light of our Court’s clear statement that ‘but for’ causation will not sustain a finding of involvement.”
