Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #274102; Unpublished
Judges Zahra, Bandstra, and Owens; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed summary disposition for plaintiff finding that although plaintiff was close to his vehicle but was not touching it when he fell, he was not entitled to no-fault benefits under §3106(1)(c) of the No-Fault Act.
The plaintiff in this case slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot. He sought no-fault benefits under the parked vehicle exception of the No-Fault Act, claiming he fell while he was entering his van. Plaintiff testified that when he fell, he was “real close” to the driver’s side door, but he had not touched the door handle nor was he touching any part of the van when he fell. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, finding that plaintiff’s testimony created a question of fact as to whether he was entitled to benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that under MCL 500.3106(1), a plaintiff must prove that his injury “arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” and “there is a causal relationship between the injury and the parked motor vehicle that is more than merely incidental, fortuitous or but for.” The court then noted that various decisions have established that generally, the claimant must be touching the door of intended entry when the accident occurred. In this case, the plaintiff was not entering his vehicle when he fell. Although he was close to his vehicle, he had not touched it, and was not actually in the process of entering the vehicle. In this regard, the court stated:
“We find that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The undisputed facts do not establish that plaintiff was entering into his vehicle when he fell and sustained his injury. Plaintiff was admittedly close to his van, reaching for the door handle, and he believes he had unlocked it using the remote entry fob. However, he had not yet touched the van and was not actually in the process of entering the van. Plaintiff was merely preparing to enter the van by reaching to open the door. that he may have been intending to enter at the time of his fall does not change this result. Under these circumstances, the exception of §3106(1)(c) is not satisfied. Reversed and remanded.”
