Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #271580; Unpublished
Judges Sawyer, Fitzgerald, and Donofrio; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, decided without oral argument, the Court of Appeals determined that where an arbitration panel found that medical expenses incurred from the date of a motor vehicle accident and the arbitration award were not related to the motor vehicle accident, that ruling did not collaterally estop plaintiff from arguing in a later action that medical expenses incurred after the date of the arbitration award were related to the motor vehicle accident.
In 2002, Leonard Serafin brought an action for no-fault benefits arising from a 1998 pedestrian/automobile accident. The parties agreed to arbitrate the matter and the arbitration panel awarded plaintiff $43,600 and found that charges from Broe Rehabilitation were unrelated to the motor vehicle accident. In exchange for payment of the arbitration award, the plaintiff signed a release which provided:
“I intend this document to release all of my claims for medical benefits from the date of loss through January 22, 2004, including all past, present and future treatment provided by Broe Rehabilitation accruing as a result of said accident.”
In June 2005, plaintiff, Serafin’s guardian, brought this action for PIP benefits regarding expenses incurred from Broe Rehabilitation after the date of the release. Plaintiff also sought a declaration regarding the validity of the release, arguing that Serafin suffered from a “mental derangement” which prevented him from understanding his rights when he signed the release. The trial court granted defendant summary disposition with regard to expenses incurred more than one year before the action was filed, but ruled a jury should resolve the release validity issue.
On appeal, defendant argued it should have been granted summary disposition on the basis of collateral estoppel with regard to all the Broe Rehabilitation expenses, because that issue had previously been decided in the previous action. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that for collateral estoppel to apply, the issues must be identical. In finding that the issues were not identical, the Court of Appeals explained that the arbitrators decided the causal connection between the Broe Rehabilitation treatment from the date of the accident until the date of the arbitration award. However, the arbitrators did not address the causal connection between the accident and the treatment rendered after the arbitration award. In this regard, the court stated:
“. . . defendant’s motion did not establish that collateral estoppel applied. The arbitrators decided the issue of the causal connection between the 1998 accident and the services provided by Broe Rehabilitation up to the date of the arbitration proceeding; they did not resolve the causal connection between the accident and services rendered after the arbitration. For collateral estoppel to apply, the ultimate issue to be determined in the subsequent action ‘must be identical, and not merely similar’ to that involved in the first action. . . . Defendant did not present any evidence concerning the Broe Rehabilitation services that were evaluated by the arbitration panel or the services provided after the arbitration to establish that the causal connection between the post-arbitration services and the accident was actually litigated and decided by the arbitrators. Thus, defendant failed to show that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court decision that the jury should resolve the release validity issue because plaintiff failed to tender back the $43,000 which was paid in consideration of the release. However, the court determined that because the arbitration decision only covered the time period from the date of the accident to the date of the decision, this decision did not affect plaintiff’s ability to challenge whether expenses incurred after the date of the award were not covered by the release. In this regard, the court stated:
“A plaintiff must tender the recited consideration before there is a right to repudiate the release. . . . In the absence of any valid argument why plaintiff was not required to tender back the consideration Serafin received for the release before challenging its validity, defendant was entitled to partial summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the release. However, this ruling does not preclude plaintiff from challenging whether the expenses incurred for services at Broe Rehabilitation Services after January 22, 2004, are outside the scope of the release. Because the scope and applicability of the release to the claimed expenses has not been litigated or briefed by the parties, we remand for consideration of that issue.”
