Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #222658; Unpublished
Judges Hoekstra, Talbot and Zahra; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile
Recoupment Between Equal Priority Insurers [3115(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that a person injured in a motor vehicle accident was not to be considered domiciled in the same “household” of his brother, where the two of them lived in the same house which had been subdivided into two distinct living quarters, and therefore, the auto insurer for the brother who lived in the separate quarters was not obligated to pay half of the PIP benefits for the injured person, as would be required under 3115(2).
David Nagy, a pedestrian, was struck and seriously injured by a motor vehicle. David did not own his own car and did not have a no-fault insurance policy in his name. David lived with his brother, Eugene, in the lower level of a house that had been divided into two distinct living quarters. In the upper level lived David’s other brother, Edward, and Edward’s wife. Eugene was insured by Titan, Edward was insured by Auto Club. Titan Insurance claimed that Auto Club was obligated to share one-half of the PIP benefits it had paid to David, pursuant to the provisions of 3115(2), which state that when two or more insurers are in the same order of priority to provide personal protection insurance benefits, the insurer paying benefits due is entitled to partial recoupment from the other insurers in the same order of priority.
Titan paid the benefits pursuant to 3114(1) which provides that a personal protection insurance policy applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling that David was domiciled in the same household as his upstairs brother Edward. The court noted that the house was jointly owned by Eugene and Edward, that it was purchased as a two-family residence, that it was divided into two separate units, and that each of the two units had separate gas meters, electric meters, entrances, living rooms, bathrooms, kitchens and bedrooms. An interior stairway was blocked off. All four of the occupants shared a common mail box and mailing address and a single home insurance policy insured the house. David had always lived on the lower level.
The Court of Appeals held that the facts were not in dispute, and therefore, the question of domicile was a question of law. The court considered the several factors for determining domicile as set forth in Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477 (1979) [Item No. 143]. However, the court determined these factors not to be particularly helpful, and concluded that the undisputed testimony clearly established that the house comprised “two separate households,” and therefore, David was not domiciled with his brother Edward.
