Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 221473; Published
Judges Holbrook, Jr., Hood and Griffin; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 246 Mich. App. 244, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Kreiner Era: 1996-2010) [§3135(7)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (Kreiner Era: 1996-2010) [§3135(7)]
Determining Serious Impairment of Body Function As a Matter of Law (Kreiner Era:1996-2010) [§3135(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this per curiam published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s injury, consisting of an acromioclavicular separation and mild tendonitis did not constitute a serious impairment of body function under the 1995 amendments to the serious impairment of body function threshold contained in section 3135 of the No-Fault Act.
In its decision, the court reversed a trial court order denying defendant summary disposition which the trial court refused to grant because a material factual dispute existed concerning plaintiff’s claim. The Court of Appeals held plaintiff’s injury did not involve a material factual dispute and therefore should have been dismissed as a matter of law. In so holding, the court referred to Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333 (2000) [Item No. 2132], which cites a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether the impairment of an important body function is serious within the meaning of the Act. These include the extent of the injury, treatment required, duration of disability, extent of residual impairment and prognosis for eventual recovery. Plaintiff’s injury was an acromioclavicular separation and mild tendonitis. She never missed a day of work as a result of her accident with the exception of a few doctor appointments and physical therapy. She admitted she was able to perform all of her normal activities, did not have significant medical treatment, had a good prognosis for recovery and had otherwise sustained a relatively minor injury. Based on the evidence, the court concluded that the record was clear that plaintiff had failed to show that her general ability to lead her normal life was significantly altered by her injury. The court also referenced Kern’s observation that the new statute “reflected a return to the standard first articulated in Cassidy v McGovern.”
