Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 230627; Published
Judges Fitzgerald, Wilder and Cooper; unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 256 Mich. App. 146, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Allowable Expenses: Reasonable Necessity Requirement [3107(1)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published opinion written by Judge Wilder, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff for unpaid PIP medical expenses and interest. Defendant argued that plaintiff had not presented a jury submissible case because plaintiff had not offered direct expert testimony that each and every expense was both reasonable and reasonably necessary, although plaintiff did present itemized bills for each and every expense. In rejecting defendant’s argument, the court stated:
“At its core, defendant’s claim is that the plaintiff must offer direct evidence from the treating physician that the expenses incurred were both reasonable and reasonably necessary in order for the plaintiff to prevail in an action under MCL 500.3107. We find no such requirement within the language of the statute, and we cannot find and defendant does not cite any binding precedent in this regard. Rather, as with any civil case, the jury is entitled to consider all of the evidence introduced by the plaintiff to decide whether plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the expenses were reasonable and necessary. M Civ JI 3.09. Thus, direct and circumstantial evidence, and permissible inferences therefrom, may be considered by the jury to determine whether there is sufficient proof that the expenses were both reasonable and necessary. See, e.g., Mull v Equitable Life, 196 Mich App 411, 421; 493 NW2d 452 (1992); M Civ JI 3.10.
While plaintiff did not provide direct testimony from two of his doctors that each and every expense was reasonable and necessary, we conclude that plaintiff did provide evidence sufficient in this regard to survive defendant’s motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As stated above, Dr. Robertson testified that the care he rendered was reasonably necessary and related to the automobile accident and that his fees were reasonable. Defendant admits that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to decide whether Dr. Robertson’s bills were allowable expenses under the no-fault act. We find that Dr. Robertson’s testimony also supports a legitimate inference that Dr. Hubers’ and Dr. Roodbeen’s charges and treatment were also reasonable and necessary. Dr. Robertson’s testimony that he, Dr. Hubers, and Dr. Roodbeen each reached the same diagnoses permitted the jury to reasonably infer that Dr. Hubers’ and Dr. Roodbeen’s treatment was necessary and related to the accident.”
