Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #235699; Unpublished
Judges Griffin, Gage and Meter; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Applicability of Comparative Fault to Noneconomic Loss Claims [3135(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint in which the trial court had determined that the evidence showed that plaintiff was more than 50% at fault for the accident, and thereby precluded from receiving any damages pursuant to section 3135(2)(b).
Plaintiff was involved in an intersection collision. He entered the intersection when the light was yellow, checked for oncoming traffic, and completed his turn. He was struck by defendant who was proceeding from the opposite direction. The trial court determined that on this evidence, plaintiff was more than 50% at fault and was therefore precluded from any damages pursuant to the provisions of section 3135(2)(b) which states that, “damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.”
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the only evidence submitted below showed that the light was yellow or red when plaintiff made the turn. Plaintiff’s testimony showed that he proceeded on a yellow light when he could have stopped safely or proceeded on a red light in violation of MCL 257.612(1)(b). Whether the court held that defendant was equally negligent could not be determined on this record. There was no evidence to show that the defendant was so close to the intersection that he could not stop safely as required by MCL 612(1)(b). Defendant had a duty to drive with due care for the safety of others, and thus, once it became clear that plaintiff was going to challenge or obstruct his right-of-way, he had a duty to avoid a collision. Whether he was negligent in failing to do so cannot be determined due to the lack of evidence. Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
