Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #227917; Published
Judges Owens, Sawyer and Cooper; unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 252 Mich. App. 76, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Liability for Intentionally Caused Harm [3135(3)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published opinion by Judge Sawyer, the Court of Appeals held that a person who became intoxicated while drinking at a bar for six (6) or seven (7) hours and then decided to drive himself home, and in the process caused a serious accident, may have been guilty of reckless conduct but not “willful and wanton” conduct that would equate with “intentionally caused harm” as that phrase is used in section 3135(3)(a). The court examined its earlier decision in Citizens Insurance Company v Lowery [Item No. 1039] and interpreted Lowery as equating intentionally caused harm with “willful and wanton” conduct but not reckless conduct. In this regard, the court stated:
“to the extent that ‘willful and wanton’ is read to include conduct less than intentional, such as recklessness, then the decision in Lowery improperly interpreted the statute and cannot stand. Therefore, we agree with Lowery to the extent that it employs a meaning of ‘willful and wanton’ that is synonymous with ‘intentional’ and we limit its holding accordingly.... While the evidence establishes that defendant exercised poor judgment in deciding to drive after consuming an immoderate amount of alcohol over several hours, particularly in light of the fact that he had made arrangements for his wife to pick him up and thereafter abandoned that plan, there is no indication that defendant intended to cause the harm which occurred. Therefore, while defendant’s conduct might be regarded as sufficiently reckless as to come within a broad definition of ‘willful and wanton,’ ... it does not come within the narrower construction of ‘willful and wanton’ that must be utilized in this case–a construction that equates with ‘intentional,’ as required by the language of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendant’s conduct was sufficiently willful and wanton to constitute intentional conduct for purposes of §3135(3)(a).”
