Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #225640; Published
Judges White, Murphy and Fitzgerald; unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 251 Mich. App. 513, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Noneconomic Loss Liability for Serious Impairment of Body Function Threshold (Definition) [3135(1)]
Objective Manifestation Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
Important Body Function Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this published opinion by Judge Murphy, the Court of Appeals rendered a significant holding regarding the definition of serious impairment of body function as contained in MCL 500.3135(7). The court held that:
“The statutory definition of serious impairment in MCL 500.3135(7) can be broken down into three requirements that must be established in order to find a serious impairment of body function. First, there must be an objectively manifested impairment. Second, the impairment must be of an important body function. Third, the impairment must affect a person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.”
With regard to the third element (i.e., life impact), the court held that it was error to hold that an impairment was “not serious enough” to affect a plaintiff’s normal life. The only thing the statute requires is that an impairment affect an injured person’s general ability to lead a normal life. There is no additional requirement that the affect be substantial, significant, long lasting or the like. In this regard, the court stated:
“We agree with the trial court that plaintiff established an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function based on the uncontested medical evidence presented by plaintiff. However, the trial court ruled that as a matter of law the impairment was not ‘serious enough’ to impinge on plaintiff’s ability to lead a normal life. This was error. The third prong of the statutory definition explicitly requires only that the impairment ‘affect the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.’ MCL 500.3135(7) does not require any additional proof. It would be improper for us to read any more requirements, limitations, or language into the unambiguous statutory definition.
Based on plaintiff’s deposition testimony, after the accident, he continued to work as a carpenter, which forced him to perform some tasks that were painful, and the pain limited his time to work on a project. Plaintiff stated that he could no longer work eight hours a day but rather is limited to six hours per day, that he can no longer do roofing work, that he can only do ladder work for twenty minutes at a time, that he cannot lift more than eighty pounds, that he cannot walk more than one-half mile, and that he can no longer participate in certain types of recreational hunting.
If these facts were not in dispute, we would find that they satisfy the third prong of the statutory definition, and plaintiff would be entitled to summary disposition on the issue of whether he suffered a serious impairment of body function pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i), contrary to the trial court’s ruling.”
The court remanded the case to the trial court for purposes of determining whether there were any material issues of fact regarding plaintiff’s claims relative to the affect of the injury on his ability to work. In this regard, the court stated, “If the court determines that there are no material factual disputes regarding plaintiff’s claimed limitations, then the court shall grant summary disposition to plaintiff on the threshold issue of serious impairment of body function. If the court determines that there are factual disputes regarding plaintiff’s claimed limitations then the matter should be submitted to the jury.”
Defendant’s motion for rehearing was denied by the court on July 17, 2002.
