Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #227418; Unpublished
Judges Neff, Fitzgerald and Talbot; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification for Intentionally Suffered Injury [3105(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, decided after remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits was properly denied under the intentional injury provisions of section 3105(4) because plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence to dispute the defendant’s allegations that plaintiff acted intentionally in causing his injury as that term as been defined under the No-Fault Act. Plaintiff in this case was being transported to a hospital in an ambulance after having been in an agitated state for most of the day and after having threatened suicide on several occasions. However, he was, at all times coherent, was voluntarily able to dress himself, was cooperative before being placed in the ambulance, and was otherwise aware of his surroundings. On the way to the hospital, plaintiff jumped out of the ambulance, sustaining severe head injuries. The defendant argued that there was not adequate evidence to prove that plaintiff’s actions were unintentional. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant. Citing several cases, including Auto-Owners Insurance v Churchman, 440 Mich 560 (1992), the Court of Appeals noted that Michigan law has clearly held for some time that a person who is mentally ill or insane can indeed intend or expect the results of his actions for purposes of applying an intentional injury exclusion in an insurance policy. In no-fault jurisprudence, the only notable exception to this line of cases is Mattson v Farmers Insurance Exchange [Item No. 1316], which was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Churchman. The court characterized Mattson as having “questionable validity” today, and distinguished Mattson on the basis that the facts in Mattson were “extraordinary.” In the Mattson case, the injured plaintiff was delusional, psychotic, hallucinating, and mumbling nonsensically. In the case at bar, the court noted, “There are no such extraordinary facts.” Although plaintiff was obviously agitated, he was, by all accounts, coherent at all times. Although he clearly indicated his desire to commit suicide, the court held that there was nothing in this case that “vitiates the conclusion that [plaintiff] acted intentionally as that term has been interpreted in the context of insurance policy exclusionary clauses. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition....”
