Michigan Supreme Court; Docket #117470; Published
Opinion by Justice Corrigan 5-2 (Justices Cavanagh and Kelly dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 466 Mich. 142, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Property Owned by Named Insured [3123(1)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 5-2 opinion by Chief Justice Corrigan, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the “household exclusion” of section 3123 operates to deny property protection insurance benefits whenever a person owning the damaged property is insured under a no-fault property protection insurance policy, even if that policy does not cover the motor vehicle that was involved at the time of the accident. In this case, the owner of a building drove a rented Ryder truck into the building causing property damage. It was not clear whether the driver of the Ryder truck was insured under a no-fault property protection policy. The Supreme Court held that if the driver was insured under a no-fault property protection insurance policy, then property protection insurance benefits were excluded by the plain language of section 3123 because the damaged property was owned by the operator of a vehicle involved in the accident. The court held that the statute does not require that the driver be named in a property protection insurance policy covering the vehicle involved in the accident. In this regard, the court held:
“MCL 500.3123(1)(b) excludes property damage from no-fault property protection coverage if the property owner, the person’s spouse, or a relative of either residing in the same household, is ‘named in a property protection insurance policy’ and was ‘the owner, registrant, or operator of a vehicle involved’ in the accident. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision in the dissent’s contention, the statute does not require that the individual be named in a property protection insurance policy covering ‘a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose.’ Rather, the plain meaning of MCL 500.3123(1)(b) indicates that if [the driver] was named in a property protection insurance policy and was the ‘operator of a vehicle involved’ in the accident, coverage for damage to his property would be excluded. Whether the no-fault policy covered a vehicle involved in the accident is not relevant under the plain language of the statute. Therefore, if [the driver] was named in a no-fault policy covering, for example, a personal vehicle, the statute would exclude property protection coverage.... Not only does our interpretation of the statute comport with the plain language of the text, but it is also consistent with the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the text, i.e., to preclude a person who damages his own property from collecting property protection insurance benefits under that person’s no-fault policy. In this case, the property damage clearly would have been excluded if [the driver] had been driving his own vehicle. The result should not be different merely because he was driving a rented one.”
In light of the fact that it was not clear whether the driver was insured under a property protection insurance policy, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Justices Cavanagh and Kelly dissented and contended that the plain meaning of the statute was to exclude property protection benefits “only when the person (or a spouse or family member) involved in an accident causing property damage is named in the property protection insurance policy covering the vehicle operated in the accident. To hold otherwise elevates the literal reading of the statute into an overbroad exclusion that hinges recovery on the fortuitous event that an individual owns any other no-fault policy.”
