Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #259105; Unpublished
Judges Fort Hood, Bandstra, and Donofrio; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Tolling of Statutes of Limitation
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed summary disposition for plaintiff, finding that Cameron v Auto Club Insurance Association, 476 Mich 55 (2006) [RB #2648], applies retroactively to preclude plaintiff from recovering personal protection insurance benefits for losses incurred more than one year before this action was filed.
The plaintiff in this case was involved in an automobile accident in June, 1999. Plaintiff received attendant care from February, 2000 to March, 2002. Defendant refused to pay for this care and plaintiff filed this action on September 16, 2003.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition based upon this Court’s decision in Cameron v Auto Club Insurance Association, 263 Mich App 95 (2004) [RB #2473]. In Cameron, this court held that the saving provision of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA) applies only to actions brought under the RJA and, therefore, does not toll actions brought under the No-Fault Act. Plaintiff appealed, arguing Cameron should only be given prospective, rather than retroactive effect. In reversing, the Court of Appeals recognized that when the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding the one-year back rule in 2006, it failed to state whether Cameron should be applied retroactively. In ruling that Cameron should be given retroactive application, the Court of Appeals followed the Supreme Court’s holding in Devillers v Auto Club Insurance Association, 473 Mich 562 (2005) [RB #2646]. In Devillers, the Supreme Court overruled Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93 (1986) [RB #936], finding that judicial tolling has no basis in the text of the no-fault statute. In declaring its decision should have retroactive effect, the court explained that the holding in Lewis was reached for policy reasons and was an “anomaly” that departed from decades of precedent. Likewise, in Cameron, the Supreme Court overruled an earlier holding in Geiger v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 114 Mich App 283 (1982) [RB #510], finding that Geiger was decided for policy reasons contrary to the clear language of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that because Devillers was given retroactive effect, so should Cameron. In this regard, the court stated:
“In Devillers, . . . the Court overruled its earlier holding in Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), that the one-year-back rule was tolled, under the judicial tolling doctrine, from the date the claim for benefits was filed until an insurer’s formal denial of liability. The Court also held that its ruling was to be given retroactive effect, explaining . . . that its prior decision in Lewis was rendered ‘purely for policy reasons and in direct contravention of the statutory language at issue.’. . . Therefore, the Court did not consider Lewis to be ‘clear and uncontradicted’ case law such that overruling that decision presented ‘exigent circumstances’ of the sort warranting the ‘extreme measure’ of prospective-only application. . . .
Analogously, our Supreme Court’s decision in Cameron II overruled the earlier holding of this Court in Geiger v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exch, 114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982), on the basis that Geiger was decided for policy reasons, based on this Court’s perception of the legislative intent, contrary to the clear language of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1). . . . Accordingly, like Lewis, Geiger does not constitute clear and uncontradicted case law, the overruling of which presents exigent circumstances warranting prospective-only application of Cameron II. Therefore, we conclude that Cameron II applies to all cases, including this one, in which the issue of the applicability of the tolling period of MCL 600.5851(1) to the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1) has been raised and preserved.”
The Court of Appeals then rejected plaintiff’s argument that the determination that MCL 600.5851(1) does not toll the one-year back rule renders that provision unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because it discriminates against minors and insane persons who file claims under the No-Fault Act. Because the No-Fault Act does not create an inherently suspect classification such as race, ethnicity, or national origin and because it does not create a quasi-suspect classification such as gender or illegitimacy, it is subject to the rational basis standard. The one-year back rule has several logical explanations, including maintaining insurance costs. The maintenance of insurance costs is a legitimate government purpose and precluding minors and insane persons from bringing an action for benefits more than one year after the benefit is incurred, is neither arbitrary or unrelated in a rational way to this purpose. In this regard, the court explained:
“To determine whether legislation violates equal protection, this Court applies one of three tests. . . . If the legislation creates an inherently suspect classification, such as race, ethnicity or national origin, or affects a fundamental interest, the ‘strict scrutiny’ test applies. . . . Quasi-suspect classifications, such as gender or illegitimacy, are subject to the ‘substantial relationship’ test. . . . Social and economic legislation is examined under the traditional ‘rational basis’ test. . . . MCL 600.5851(1) distinguishes between groups of minors and insane persons based on their cause of action, by tolling the statute of limitations period for certain causes of actions, but not tolling the one-year-back rule limiting the recovery of damages in no-fault actions. Therefore, the appropriate standard for analyzing plaintiff’s equal protection claim is the rational basis test. . . .
As our Supreme Court explained in Cameron II, supra at 66-67, the distinction drawn by the Legislature in MCL 600.5851(1) has ‘several conceivable explanations,’ including maintaining the affordability of no-fault automobile insurance for Michigan drivers. Controlling no-fault insurance costs is a legitimate government purpose. We cannot say that the classification set forth in MCL 600.5851(1) is arbitrary and completely unrelated in a rational way to this purpose. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that MCL 600.5851(1) is unconstitutional.”
