Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #262964; Published
Judges Whitbeck, Talbot, and Murray; unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 269 Mich. App. 596, Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Injured Persons and Dependents as Payees [3112]
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Tolling of Statutes of Limitations
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of who was a proper “claimant” under §3112 of the no-fault statute for purposes of seeking attendant care benefits from the insurance company on behalf of an injured minor child. The court also addressed the constitutionality of the 1993 amendment to MCL 600.5851(1) as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Cameron v Auto Club Insurance Association, 263 Mich App 95 (2004), and held the savings provisions of MCL 600.5851(1) for minor children does not apply to no-fault actions and the one-year back rule contained in §3145 of the no-fault statute.
In 1998, an 8-year-old child, Aris Hatcher, was struck by a motor vehicle while riding her bicycle. She sustained a head trauma resulting in the need for daily care and nursing services (attendant care). In May 2004, Aris Hatcher applied for personal protection benefits through the Assigned Claims Fund which assigned her claim to State Farm. State Farm denied the claim, invoking the one-year statute of limitations contained in §3145 of the no-fault statute. An action was filed by Kimberly Hatcher, Next Friend for her daughter, Aris Hatcher, seeking personal protection insurance benefits under the statute. State Farm moved for summary disposition, relying upon the Court of Appeals decision in Cameron v Auto Club Insurance Association, supra, which held the provisions of MCL 600.5851 do not toll the one year statute of limitations contained in the no-fault statute. Kimberly Hatcher responded by arguing the Cameron decision and its interpretation of the amendment in 1993 to MCL 600.5851 violated due process and equal protection. State Farm replied, arguing MCL 600.5851 did not apply because the claim for attendant care services belonged to Kimberly Hatcher, not Aris Hatcher.
The court first addressed the issue of who was the proper person to make claim for attendant care services provided by Kimberly Hatcher to her injured daughter, Aris Hatcher. State Farm contended that because Kimberly, as the child’s mother, was legally responsible for Aris Hatcher’s expenses, Kimberly Hatcher is the one entitled to payment for the services rendered. In upholding the trial court’s conclusion that the right to bring a personal protection insurance action, including claims for attendant care services, belongs to the injured party, the court noted that §3112 of the statute provides in part,“Personal protection insurance benefits are payable to or for the benefit of an injured person.” Under the facts of this case, the court held, “The statute confers a cause of action on the injured party and does not create an independent cause of action for the party who is legally responsible for the injured party’s expenses. Further, a parent’s cause of action to recover benefits for expenses incurred during an insured’s minority is derivative of the injured minor’s rights under the no-fault act. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court correctly held that the right to bring a personal protection insurance action, including claims for attendant care services, belongs to the injured party.”
In addressing the statute of limitations issue, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court ruling that the Cameron decision was violative of the Constitution. First, the court noted the Cameron decision “merely enforced the 1993 amendment to MCL 600.5851(1)” and, therefore, it is the constitutionality of the amendment and not the decision in Cameron which was at issue. Consistent with Cameron, the court noted the provisions of MCL 600.5851(1) were amended in 1993 to provide, in pertinent part:
“If the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.”
(emphasis in original)
The court noted the language “under this act” was added in 1993 and in Cameron that phrase was interpreted to mean the minority tolling provisions applied only to actions brought under the RJA, and not to no-fault actions. Therefore, pursuant to Cameron, the Court of Appeals held that because §3145 is not contained in the RJA, the savings provisions of MCL 600.5851(1) do not apply to no-fault actions.
In addressing plaintiff’s constitutional arguments, the court applied the “rational basis test” and found the amendment in 1993 to the RJA did not violate equal protection because the amendment was not “arbitrary” or “completely unrelated in a rational way to its objective.” The court also addressed plaintiff’s due process argument and held the amendment in 1993 to the RJA did bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible Legislative objective and, because the statute of limitations is a procedural, not substantive, rule, it must be upheld unless the party demonstrates it is so harsh and unreasonable in its consequences it effectively divests plaintiffs of the access to the courts intended by the grant of the substantive right. Here, the court held the amendments are not so harsh and unreasonable they effectively deny plaintiff’s access to the courts.
The court, therefore, reversed the trial court’s ruling that Cameron was wrongly decided and remanded for entry of an Order granting summary disposition to State Farm.