Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #260109; Unpublished
Judges Cooper, Fort Hood, and Gribbs; 2-1 (Judge P.J. Cooper dissenting); per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Kreiner Era - 1996-2010) [3135(7)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam opinion, decided without oral argument after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kreiner v Fischer [RB #2428], interpreting the statutory definition of serious body function, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s claim for non-economic losses.
In this case, plaintiff sustained “medically identifiable injuries” which affected her ability to move her back and neck. Describing the injury as a “whiplash-type injury” which caused pain and affected plaintiff’s flexibility, the court upheld the trial court determination that the injuries did not affect plaintiff’s general ability to lead her normal life.
The record reflected plaintiff was treated conservatively with physical therapy and medication. She was medically restricted from working for four months, whereupon she was able to return to work until she lost her job. The only lasting effect on plaintiff’s overall life was difficulty doing housework and gardening and inability to bowl and work on cars. The court noted that these “last two restrictions appeared to be self-imposed and thus do not qualify as residual impairment.” Holding the affect on plaintiff’s general life was “minimal” the trial court grant of summary disposition was affirmed.
Judge Cooper, in her dissent, would find plaintiff’s injuries did affect her general ability to lead her normal life. Plaintiff was in her late 50's, and her life was comprised of activities like housework and gardening. Since she was no longer able to do these activities, Judge Cooper would find plaintiff met the statutory no-fault threshold.
