Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 136905; Published
Opinion by Justice Kelly 4-3 (Justices Markman, Corrigan and Young dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 487 Mich. 289, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [3145(1)]
Tolling of Limitations for Minors [3145(1)]
Tolling of Limitations for Mental Incompetence [3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 4-3 decision written by Justice Kelly, joined by Justices Cavanagh, Hathaway, and Weaver, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the decision in Cameron v Auto Club Insurance Association and held that the one-year-back rule set forth in Section 3145(1) of the no-fault statute was subject to the tolling provisions of MCL 600.5851(1), which protect the claims of minors and those who are traumatically insane. In Cameron, the Supreme Court held that the tolling provisions of MCL 600.5851 did not apply to the no-fault one-year-back rule because those tolling provisions only apply to “statutes of limitations” and the no-fault one-year-back rule was not a statute of limitations, but rather was a “damages limitations.” In disapproving this reasoning, the majority Opinion in Regents of U of M held that:
“The Cameron majority concluded that actions brought pursuant to MCL 600.5851(1) are subject to the one-year-back rule because that statute does not implicate when a plaintiff may ‘bring an action.’ We conclude that the statutory language in MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 500.3145(1) does not command the conclusion that the Cameron majority reached. To begin with, we conclude that the approach in Cameron was flawed because it read the statutory language in isolation. MCL 600.5851(1) does not create its own independent cause of action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. In no-fault cases, for example, MCL 600.5851(1) must be read together with MCL 500.3145(1). Doing so, the statutes grant infants and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to ‘bring the action’ ‘for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits . . . for accidental bodily injury. . . .’ On the basis of its language, MCL 600.5851(1) supercedes all limitations in MCL 500.3145(1), including the one-year-back rule’s limitation on the period of recovery.”
The majority Opinion then reviewed a number of decisions prior to Cameron and concluded that there was no rational basis to conclude that the one-year-back rule was not subject to the tolling provisions of MCL 600.5851(1). In this regard, the Court stated:
“In sum, for more than 20 years before Cameron, the majority in all of the Court’s relevant opinions saw no basis for treating any of the provisions of MCL 500.3145(1) differently. In Welton v Carriers Ins Co, we made a distinction among the provisions only to the extent of noting that the section contains ‘two limitations on time of suit and one limitation on period of recovery[.]’ Even then, the Welton Court saw no basis for treating the provisions differently. Indeed, the law was so well settled that the defendants in Cameron did not even argue for different treatment until this Court heard oral argument on appeal. Thus, we conclude that Cameron erroneously held that MCL 600.5851(1) does not protect a plaintiff’s claim fro the one-year-back rule.”
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the no-fault PIP benefit claims of minors and mentally incompetent persons are tolled by MCL 600.5851(1) and, thus, are not subject to the one-year-back rule limitations set forth in Section 3145(1) of the No-Fault Act.
Justice Markman dissented, joined by Justices Corrigan and Young, and argued that the one-year-back rule is not a statute of limitations, but is rather a damages limitation provision and, therefore, is not subject to the tolling provisions of MCL 600.5851(1). Justice Young filed a separate dissent, joined by Justice Corrigan, wherein he assailed the “new majority” for its lack of respect for case law precedent. He went on to review in detail the cases that the new majority had overruled, contrary to “well-established principles of stare decisis.”
