Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #253128; Unpublished
Judges Gage, Whitbeck and Saad; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Kreiner Era - 1996-2010) [3135(7)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion decided after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kreiner v Fischer [RB #2428] interpreting the statutory definition of serious body function, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s non-economic loss claim. The 69-year-old plaintiff in this case was recovering from a shoulder injury she incurred in a slip and fall accident when she reinjured the shoulder in an automobile accident. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeals found that plaintiff’s injury did not affect her general ability to lead her normal life because her life style before and after her automobile accident were unchanged. In this regard, the court pointed out:
“At the time of plaintiff’s slip and fall accident, she was a sixty-nine year old retiree who enjoyed taking care of her grandchildren, attending church, dancing, and traveling. Plaintiff’s slip and fall accident caused a sprained shoulder, for which her doctor prescribed pain medication and physical therapy. Plaintiff continued to take pain medication and attend physical therapy at the time of the automobile accident. Plaintiff testified that after the slip and fall accident, she could no longer do any of the activities listed above. In addition, she could no longer cook, do housework, drive, or bathe and dress herself without assistance. . . . On the day of the automobile accident, plaintiff’s right arm was in a sling. With the exception of the day of the automobile accident, plaintiff did not drive for five to six months after the slip and fall accident. At her deposition, plaintiff was asked what lifestyle changes had occurred after the automobile accident, when compared with her lifestyle before the accident. Plaintiff identified all the tasks and activities that she could no longer perform or participate in after the slip and fall accident. In response to questioning by defense counsel, plaintiff stated that she was ‘unable’ to do the same activities before and after the automobile accident. In addition, when questioned by her own counsel, plaintiff was asked if she was able to attend to her personal grooming the morning of the automobile accident, and she responded, ‘No, I really couldn’t do it . . . before the accident and after the accident I wasn’t able to do it.’ Also, when asked if there was a change in the way she was able to move her shoulder after the automobile accident, plaintiff responded, ‘[I]t was still the same. I couldn’t reach, I couldn’t lift.’ In addition, plaintiff testified that she was now able to drive with her left arm, she has begun to attend church once or twice a month, and she was able to attend a funeral in Alabama a week before the deposition. These are all activities plaintiff testified that she was no longer able to do after the slip and fall accident. Therefore, plaintiff’s lifestyle before and after the automobile accident were not different. We cannot say that the accident affected her ability to lead her normal life”
The court also determined that even though plaintiff presented a disability certificate which stated she could no longer do housework or care for her personal needs, this was insufficient to show her life had changed before and after the accident. In this regard, it stated:
“Plaintiff also presented a disability certificate. Although the certificate stated that plaintiff was disabled from performing ‘housework’ and ‘caring for [her] personal needs,’ plaintiff failed to provide any additional documentary evidence to show that her current disabilities represented a change in her lifestyle before the automobile accident. . . . Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting defendants summary disposition.”
