Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 245562; Unpublished
Judges Markey, Wilder, and Meter; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Kreiner Era: 1996-2010) [3135(7)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (Kreiner Era: 1996-2010) [3135(7)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion decided after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kreiner v Fischer [RB #2428] interpreting the statutory definition of serious impairment of body function, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s non-economic loss claim. This case returned to the Court of Appeals after the remand which was ordered in RB #2467. On remand, the trial court again found that plaintiff’s injuries failed to meet the threshold of serious impairment of body function. Those injuries were ill-defined and apparently involved plaintiff’s neck and back. Plaintiff alleged that because of her automobile accident, she was not able to travel in a car for more than hour or so, do any long distance walking, stand for over five minutes, or climb stairs. She further testified that she could not play with her grandchildren as she once had and was no longer able to have her hair styled regularly at a beauty salon because the movements required at the salon caused dizziness. However, plaintiff missed only two to three weeks of work and a few other days “here and there” because of her accident. Furthermore, she had not been restricted in her driving by any physician. In holding that these injuries did not affect plaintiff’s general ability to lead her normal life within the meaning of the Kreiner decision, the court stated:
“Here, plaintiff testified . . . that she missed only two or three weeks and additional number of ‘days here and there’ of work because of the accident. The work she missed does not automatically mean that the accident affected her general ability to lead her normal life. Indeed, plaintiff’s missed work is comparable to--or even less significant than--Kreiner’s having to ‘limit his workday to six hours because he can no longer work eight-hour days.’ Also, while plaintiff may not be able to take her children to Cedar Point or play with them in the backyard, the nature and extent of her injuries surely do not prohibit her from engaging in some type of activities with them. Plaintiff testified that her grandchildren do not ‘come [and spend weekends with her] as much as they used to come,’ implying that they do still spend some weekends with her. This is somewhat comparable to the situation in Kreiner, where the plaintiff ‘can no longer hunt rabbits, although he continues to hunt deer.’ In other words, certain of plaintiff’s activities have been altered or curtailed, but not eliminated from her life. Moreover, plaintiff testified that she cannot do any ‘long distance walking,’ implying that she can still do some walking. Again, this is comparable to Kreiner, in which the plaintiff ‘has difficulty walking more than a half mile without resting.’ Like in Kreiner, the restrictions mentioned above, as well as the additional lifestyle restrictions cited by plaintiff, simply do not ‘affect [plaintiff’s] overall ability to conduct the course of [her] normal life.’ While some impact on plaintiff’s life is apparent, the impact is not sufficient to meet the threshold required under the no-fault act. Plaintiff can work full-time, she can visit with her grandchildren, she can walk, she can use the elevator (instead of the stairs) at her school, and she can prepare at least some food for family potlucks, even if she can no longer cook an entire meal for holiday celebrations. The trial court correctly held that plaintiff failed to meet the threshold for tort liability under the no-fault act and that summary disposition for defendants was appropriate.” (emphasis in original)
