Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #247579; Unpublished
Judges Murphy, O’Connell, and Gage; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Uninsured Motorist Benefits: Physical Contact Requirement
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Auto Owners Insurance Company was obligated to pay uninsured motorist benefits where Tonya Jefferson sustained severe spinal cord injuries rendering her a quadriplegic while she was standing on the running boards of her friend’s truck when it was struck by an uninsured vehicle. The Auto Owners insurance policy covering the truck stated that Auto Owners would pay benefits to anyone injured by an uninsured vehicle while “occupying” the truck. Auto Owners contended that standing on the truck’s running boards did not qualify as “occupying” for purpose of recovering uninsured benefits. Rather, Auto Owners contended that the term occupying should be construed restrictively so it only encompassed actual occupancy of the interior of the vehicle, entrance into the vehicle with the intention of being transported, or egress from the vehicle at the completion of actual transport. Because Tonya Jefferson’s contact with the insured vehicle at the time of the accident was solely for the purposes of social contact and not for transportation, Auto Owners argued that Ms. Jefferson was not “occupying” the vehicle at the time of the injury.
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the uninsured motorist portion of the policy did not define “occupying.” Nevertheless, the no-fault portion of the policy defined the term “occupying” as “in or upon or entering into or alighting from the vehicle.” Based upon this contractual definition, the court stated:
“Therefore, we apply the contract’s use of the term ‘occupying’ to mean ‘upon’ so that the term’s meaning will remain ‘consistent throughout the document in keeping with the policy of interpreting insurance contracts as a whole.’ . . . We do not adopt plaintiff’s suggestion that we should interpret the same, defined term differently in different portions of the contract because such an approach would run contrary to these established principles of contract interpretation. Pursuant to the policy’s definition of ‘occupying,’ . . . [Tonya Jefferson] by her presence ‘upon’ the vehicle, was ‘occupying’ it when she incurred her bodily injury.”
