Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #247834; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Markey, and O’Connell; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Uninsured Motorist Benefits: Uninsured Motorist Coverage in General
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff regarding the meaning of defendant’s “other insurance clause” in the context of plaintiff’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly construed this provision in accordance with plaintiff’s interpretation and, therefore, plaintiff was not subject to the policy’s prohibition against combining the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage with the limits of uninsured motorist coverage available under another policy. In this regard, the court held:
“We conclude that the clear language of defendant’s ‘other insurance’ provision demonstrates that the prohibition against combining limits applies if an ‘insured’ is a ‘named insured under other similar insurance available to him.’ Titan’s policy does not define ‘named insured’ but lists Claude High as the ‘named insured’ under the policy. Defendant’s policy defines ‘named insured’ as ‘the individual named in the declarations and also includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household.’ Because contract terms must be read in accord, the ‘named insured’ under paragraph one of defendant’s ‘other insurance’ provision refers to defendant’s definition of that term. According to defendant’s definition, High, as the individual named in the declaration, is the ‘named insured’ of Titan’s policy. Thus, David was not a ‘named insured’ under either policy.
Moreover, the second paragraph of defendant’s ‘other insurance’ provision contains the phrase ‘[s]ubject to the foregoing paragraph.’ Because the two paragraphs are interrelated, we find that the second paragraph applies only to an ‘insured’ who is a ‘named insured’ as stated in the first paragraph. Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly concluded that defendant’s ‘other insurance’ provision was inapplicable to David because he was not a ‘named insured’ of another similar policy; consequently, David was not subject to the policy’s prohibition against combining the limits of defendant’s policy with the limits of another similar policy. The trial court properly granted summary disposition for plaintiff pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2).”
