Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #360540; Unpublished
Judges Gleicher, Jansen, and Hood; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEX:
Transportation Network Exclusion Enforceability [§3113(e)]
TOPICAL INDEX:
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s (“Esurance”) motion for summary disposition, in which Esurance sought dismissal of Plaintiff Valere Scott’s action for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals found no issue of material fact as to whether Scott was logged onto a ridesharing application at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident and thus barred from PIP benefits due to a coverage exclusion authorized under MCLs 500.3113(e) and 500.3017.
Valere Scott was injured in a motor vehicle accident in October 2019, after which she sought PIP benefits from Esurance under her policy. Shortly after, Scott admitted during a phone call with Esurance that she was driving her vehicle for Lyft at the time of the accident. Scott’s insurance policy included a provision which, in accordance with MCLs 500.3113(e) and 500.3017, excluded PIP benefits for accidents that occurred while the insured was logged into applications used for ridesharing purposes. Esurance denied Scott’s claim in January 2020 because Scott was “operating [her] vehicle as a transportation networking company vehicle when the automobile accident occurred.” In October 2020, Scott filed suit. Esurance denied the allegations of the complaint and asserted an affirmative defense that coverage was lawfully excluded under the policy and MCLs 500.3113(e) and 500.3017. In her deposition, Scott admitted she was logged into the Lyft application at the time but had not picked up a passenger yet. Based on her testimony, Lyft records, and the police report, Esurance moved for summary disposition, arguing that Scott was precluded from PIP coverage under her policy and there was no genuine issue of material fact that Scott was logged into Lyft at the time of the accident. Scott argued there were factual disputes regarding the time of the accident from the police report, whether she was logged into Lyft at the time of the accident, and whether the rideshare exclusion was added to her policy after she procured it. Further, Scott argued that the trial court improperly considered hearsay evidence when it granted Esurance’s motion for summary disposition.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err when it granted Esurance’s motion. Insurers can “avoid coverage of PIP benefits under certain enumerated circumstances.” Id. at 4 (citing Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287, 303; 954 NW2d 115 (2020)). Pursuant to MCL 500.3017, insurers may incorporate an exclusion into their policies for accidents occurring while the driver is logged into a rideshare application and avoid PIP coverage for those accidents. The Court found the language of Scott’s policy was plain and unambiguous. Further, the Court disagreed with Scott’s argument that the police report was inadmissible hearsay, writing, “it is ‘not necessarily the case’ that the substance of the reports, or even potentially the reports themselves, would be inadmissible at trial (quoting Latits v Phillips, 298 Mich App 109 at 114).” With respect to the Lyft records, the Court noted that those are possibly admissible under the business record-exception.
“And where there is a plausible basis for the admission’ of evidence, a party need not lay a proper foundation for its admission before the trial court may consider that evidence at the summary-disposition stage. See Barnard, 285 Mich App at 373-374. The trial court therefore did not err in considering the police reports and Lyft records when evaluating Esurance’s motion for summary disposition. Even if it had, Scott’s own admission that she was logged into the Lyft app at the time of the accident was by itself enough to support the grant of summary disposition.”
