Wilson v Duron, et al (COA – UNP 8/31/2023; RB #4622)
Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #359827; Unpublished
Judges Gadola, Borrello, and Hood; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEX:
Objective Manifestation Element of Serious Impairment (McCormick Era: 2010 – Present) [§3135(5)**]
Important Body Function Element of Serious Impairment (McCormick Era: 2010 – Present) [§3135(5)**]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (McCormick Era: 2010 – Present) [§3135(5)**]
Applicability of Comparative Fault to Noneconomic Loss Claims [§3135(2)]
TOPICAL INDEX:
Gross Negligence Exception to Governmental Immunity
Motor-Vehicle Exception to Governmental Tort Liability Act
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Livonia Public School’s (“Livonia Public Schools”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Rachel Wilson’s automobile negligence action. The Court of Appeals held, first, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by letting Wilson amend her complaint to explicitly cite MCL 691.1405, the statute which sets forth the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals held, second, that a question of fact existed as to whether Duron was the proximate cause of Wilson’s injuries for purposes of MCL 691.1407. The Court of Appeals held, third, that there was a question of fact as to whether Laura Duron, a bus driver for Livonia Public Schools, was grossly negligent when she crashed into a vehicle being driven by Wilson. And the Court of Appeals held, fourth, that there was a question of fact as to whether plaintiff suffered a “serious impairment of body function” under MCL 500.3157 and McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).
Laura Duron was driving a school bus full of children for Livonia Public Schools when she crashed into a vehicle being driven by Rachel Wilson. A witness to the crash later testified that Duron abruptly cut across two lanes of traffic before attempting a rolling left-turn without yielding to Wilson. Wilson fractured her wrist as a result of the collision, and later testified that as a result of her injury, she missed work, received several months’ worth of attendant care from her husband, struggled to exercise, and struggled to care for her son with special needs. She ultimately filed an automobile negligence action against Duron and Livonia Public Schools, including counts for both negligence and gross negligence. Duron and Livonia Public Schools moved for summary disposition, arguing (1) that Wilson’s action failed because she failed to explicitly cite MCL 691.1407, (2) that Duron was not grossly negligent as a matter of law, (3) that Duron’s conduct was not ‘the proximate cause’ of Wilson’s injuries for purposes of MCL 691.1407, because Wilson’s failure to yield was at least partially responsible for the crash, and (4) that Wilson’s wrist fractures did not constitute a “serious impairment of body function.” In addition to responding to the motion, Wilson requested leave to amend her complaint to explicitly mention MCL 691.1405, which the trial court granted. The trial court then denied the rest of the defendants’ motion, finding questions of fact as to negligence, gross negligence, proximate cause, and Wilson’s injuries.
The Court of Appeals affirmed both the trial court’s decision to allow Wilson to amend her complaint and the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Regarding the trial court’s decision to allow Wilson to amend her complaint, the Court of Appeals noted that Wilson was not asserting a new claim or theory of recovery but clarifying her existing claims. Moreover, while Wilson’s amended complaint alleged ordinary and gross negligence against Duron and Livonia Public Schools more clearly, her original complaint “still pleaded facts evidencing alleged negligent operation by a government employee of a governmental agency’s motor vehicle and gross negligence by a governmental employee, thereby stating ‘claim[s] that fit[] within a statutory exception to immunity.’”
“In this case, despite defendants’ complaints about the timing of plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint, defendants failed to establish they had no ‘reasonable notice, from any source,’ that plaintiff’s claims relied on the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity and the alleged gross negligence of Duron. Plaintiff argued she properly pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity in her original complaint and in her response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and the trial court explicitly explained what plaintiff needed to do in her amendment to cure the defects in her complaint. No new claims were being added through the amendment; instead, the existing claims were to be clarified. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint more clearly alleged negligence against LPS and gross negligence against Duron. Plaintiff’s request to amend was the direct result of defendants’ asserted defense and, as the trial court noted, defendants’ motion for summary disposition demonstrated that they were well aware of the nature of plaintiff’s claims. Despite the deficiencies in the clarity of plaintiff’s original complaint, she still pleaded facts evidencing alleged negligent operation by a governmental employee of a governmental agency’s motor vehicle and gross negligence by a governmental employee, thereby stating ‘claim[s] that fit[] within a statutory exception to immunity.’ Kendricks, 270 Mich App at 681.
In addition to there being no evidence of ‘undue prejudice’ to defendants from allowing the amendment, as we have already discussed, the record does not support a conclusion that the delay was ‘undue’ where plaintiff apparently believed the original complaint sufficiently pleaded facts in avoidance of governmental immunity. See Weymers, 454 Mich at 658. There is also no evidence of bad faith or dilatory motive by plaintiff, and there is no evidence of repeated failures to cure deficiencies. See id. For the reasons to be discussed below regarding whether plaintiff established questions of material fact to survive summary disposition, allowing the amendment was not futile. See id. Hence, particularized reasons that would have justified denying the motion to amend did not exist. Id. Defendants have not demonstrated on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Titan, 270 Mich App at 346; Nowacki, 319 Mich App at 148.
With respect to Defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the Court held, first, that a question of fact existed as to whether Duron was grossly negligent. The Court noted that a witness to the crash described Duron as cutting across two lanes of traffic before rolling through a stop sign and crashing into Wilson’s vehicle while attempting a left turn. Based on this evidence, “a reasonable juror could conclude Duron demonstrated a willful disregard for safety and a substantial risk of harm to the children she was transporting and other drivers on the road, constituting gross negligence.
“Barnett specifically testified that the bus had stopped to drop off students and then merged from the far- right lane across two lanes to the center left-turn lane, accomplishing this maneuver within a short distance by ‘a diagonal cutting across two lanes into the left-hand turn lane.’ Barnett saw plaintiff’s vehicle approaching from the opposite direction as the bus merged across two lanes of traffic, and Barnett observed the bus merely “slow down” and continue ‘rolling,’ without making a complete stop, before proceeding to make the left turn. Barnett testified that ‘the bus struck the minivan.’
From this evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, a reasonable juror could conclude that Duron demonstrated a willful disregard for safety and substantial risk of harm to the children she was transporting and other drivers on the road, constituting gross negligence, by making a sudden double-lane change over a short distance and immediately turning left without stopping, in a reckless attempt to beat the visible and closely approaching oncoming traffic in completing her turn. MCL 257.650(1); MCL 691.1407(8)(a); Tarlea, 263 Mich App at 90. The trial court did not err by concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether Duron was grossly negligent. Kendricks, 270 Mich App at 682; Broz, 331 Mich App at 45.”
The Court of Appeals held, second, that a question of fact existed as to whether Duron was the proximate cause of Wilson’s injuries. Duron and Livonia Public Schools argued that Wilson’s failure to yield was the proximate cause of the collision, and alternatively, that Wilson’s failure to yield was at least a partial cause of the collision, and thus Duron’s conduct could not be said to have been ‘the proximate cause’ of Wilson’s injuries for purposes of MCL 691.1407(2)(c). The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments, holding that a reasonable juror could conclude, based on the evidence, that Wilson was neither comparatively negligent nor the proximate cause of the collision.
“Here, there are genuine questions of material fact on which reasonable minds could differ regarding whether any comparative negligence by plaintiff was a proximate cause of the accident. From the record evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that the bus hit plaintiff’s vehicle when Duron turned directly into plaintiff’s vehicle and that there was no possible action plaintiff could have taken to avoid the collision, whether or not plaintiff was also guilty of negligence. See DePriest, 379 Mich at 46-47. Combined with the evidence creating genuine questions of material fact regarding whether Duron was negligent and whether plaintiff’s injury resulted from negligence by Duron, it cannot be concluded as a matter of law that LPS was entitled to immunity under MCL 691.1405. The trial court did not err by denying summary disposition on this ground.4 Broz, 331 Mich App at 45.
Similarly, the same questions of fact existing on this record preclude this Court from assessing the parties’ respective negligence and weighing their respective legal responsibility to determine ‘the proximate cause’ of the accident and plaintiff’s injuries for purposes of determining whether Duron is entitled to immunity under MCL 691.1407(2). Ray II, 321 Mich App at 760- 761. Thus, the trial court also did not err by denying summary disposition on this ground. Broz, 331 Mich App at 45.”
Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Wilson’s injuries constituted a “serious impairment of body function.” With respect to the first prong in the test for "serious impairment of body function,”—whether Wilson’s injuries were “objectively manifested”—the Court noted that Plaintiff’s wrist fractures were clearly observable or perceivable from actual conditions. With respect to the second prong—whether Wilson’s impairments were of an “important body function”—the Court wrote that “[i]t almost goes without saying that a person’s dominant hand and wrist is ‘a body function of great value, significace, or consequence.” And with respect to the third prong—whether Wilson’s impairments affected her “general ability to lead her normal life”—the Court noted that, according to the evidence, Wilson was unable to care for herself or for her family for a period of time following the collision. It did not matter, therefore, that she returned to her normal life thereafter; even a temporary disruption in a person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life is sufficient for the “general ability” prong.
“Yet, defendants argue that plaintiff “did not suffer an objectively manifested impairment” because the ‘extent of Plaintiff’s injuries only includes a nondisplaced fracture of her right wrist.’ Defendants then list all of the injuries that plaintiff undisputedly did not have. Defendants seem to imply that because plaintiff also did not suffer certain additional acute traumatic injuries, her wrist fractures cannot constitute an objectively manifested impairment. This argument is completely divorced from the McCormick standard and thus entirely without merit. See id.
Next, plaintiff was right handed and the impairment to her right wrist constitutes ‘an impairment of an important body function, which is a body function of great value, significance, or consequence to the injured person.’ MCL 500.3135(5)(b). It almost goes without saying that a person’s dominant hand and wrist is ‘a body function of great value, significance, or consequence.’ Id. Moreover, ‘this prong is an inherently subjective inquiry that must be decided on a case-by-case basis, because what may seem to be a trivial body function for most people may be subjectively important to some, depending on the relationship of that function to the person’s life.’ McCormick, 487 Mich at 199. Plaintiff’s testimony supports a conclusion that her right wrist was an important body function to her, the use of which was necessary to her ordinary tasks involving typical cleaning, cooking, and use of a computer. Id. There were accordingly questions of fact regarding the second prong. Id. . . .
Here, plaintiff presented evidence that because of her impairment, she was unable to care for herself or her family for a period of time to the same extent that she previously had been able. There was also evidence that plaintiff’s impairment had affected her ability to exercise, work, and sleep. Accordingly, there was evidence creating a question of fact on the third prong. Id. Defendants’ focus on arguing that plaintiff is currently without restrictions misses the point because ‘the statute merely requires that a person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life has been affected, not destroyed[;]’ there “is no quantitative minimum as to the percentage of a person’s normal manner of living that must be affected[;]’ and ‘the statute does not create an express temporal requirement as to how long an impairment must last in order to have an effect on ‘the person’s general ability to live his or her normal life.’ ’ McCormick, 487 Mich at 202, 203. Defendants have demonstrated a total misunderstanding of the McCormick standard in advancing their appellate arguments.”
