Al-Rahimi, et al v Allstate Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 8/17/2023; RB #4621)
Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #362652; Unpublished
Judges Boonstra, Letica, and Feeney; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEX:
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (McCormick Era: 2010 – Present) [§3135(1)]
TOPICAL INDEX:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Jamal Al-Rahimi’s automobile negligence action against Defendant Sophia Ryana Oakes. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Al-Rahimi’s impairments affected his general ability to lead his normal life—the third prong in the test for “serious impairment of body function,” set forth in MCL 500.3135 and McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).
Sophia Ryana Oakes crashed her vehicle into a vehicle driven by Jamal Al-Rahimi as Al-Rahimi pulled out of a gas station. Al-Rahimi did not receive medical treatment until the day after the crash, when he went to the emergency room and was diagnosed with ‘nonspecific myalgias’ and ‘possible osseous contusions.’ Al-Rahimi received considerable treatment over the next several months, including undergoing imaging studies which revealed a herniated disc in his cervical spine and a torn meniscus in his knee, both of which were ultimately related to the crash by various doctors. Al-Rahimi proceeded to file an automobile negligence action against Oakes, and Oakes moved for summary disposition, arguing that Al-Rahimi failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether he suffered objectively manifested impairments which affected his general ability to lead his normal life—the first and third prongs of the test for “serious impairment of body function.” The trial court disagreed with Oakes regarding the first prong, noting that two doctors related Al-Rahimi’s impairments to the crash, but agreed with Oakes regarding the third prong, noting that none of Al-Rahimi’s medical records explicitly related Al-Rahimi’s claimed inability to lead his normal life to the crash. Summary disposition was therefore granted in Oakes’s favor.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order, holding that a question of fact existed as to whether Al-Rahimi’s impairments affected his general ability to lead his normal life. The Court noted, firstly, that Oakes did not present any evidence in her motion to suggest that Al-Rahimi’s general ability to lead his normal life was not affected by his injuries, and thus the burden never shifted to Al-Rahimi to establish a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. Oakes argued only that there was nothing other than “self-serving testimony” to substantiate Al-Rahimi’s claimed effect(s) on his general ability to lead his normal life, but the Court noted that there was evidence in the record that Al-Rahimi was disabled from work and performing household services—which his father performed for him—for at least six months following the crash. Accordingly, even if the burden had shifted to Al-Rahimi, a genuine issue of material fact existed, based on his six-months of disability, as to whether Al-Rahimi’s general ability to lead his normal life was affected by his impairments.
“Despite the language barrier, plaintiff testified that he received treatment in the form of diagnostic MRIs, medication, and physical therapy. He was given a disability certificate, and his father performed replacement services. Accordingly, defendant’s contention that plaintiff only offered self-serving testimony regarding his injuries was not supported by the record. Moreover, defendant concluded that plaintiff also offered self-serving testimony about his ability to live his life without initially supporting the contention with documentary evidence addressing the general ability to live a normal life. Specifically, defendant must support its claim for summary disposition by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. McCoig Materials LLC v Galui Constr, Inc, 295 Mich App 684, 693; 818 NW2d 410 (2012). Once this evidence is presented, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Id. Because defendant failed to make and support the contention that plaintiff’s general ability to live his normal life was not impacted, there was no burden placed on plaintiff to address defendant’s contention. . . .
Nonetheless, in McCormick, the Court noted that a ‘normal life’ may be impacted when a plaintiff previously went from working 60 hours a week as a ‘medium truck loader’ to being unable to work for a minimum of 14 months and precluded from returning to the same job. Additionally, an inability to engage in hobbies at the same skill level and an inability to attend to personal needs impacted a plaintiff’s ‘normal life.’ See McCormick, 487 Mich at 217. The record in this case reflects that plaintiff testified that he experienced pain with ‘movement’ and, if he moved ‘a lot,’ he felt pain in his left knee. Plaintiff further testified that his doctor disabled him from performing replacement services or housework, and there was documentary evidence that plaintiff’s father performed replacement services. Additionally, plaintiff testified that he worked full-time as a driver, and he stopped working between the time of the accident and March 17, 2020, or approximately six months. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, plaintiff’s evidence did present a factual issue regarding the accident and its impact on his general ability to live a normal life.”
