Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Mich Auto Ins Placement Facility (COA – UNP 8/10/2023; RB #4624)
Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #362955; Unpublished
Judges Boonstra, Letica, and Feeney; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEX:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEX:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company (“Frankenmuth”), in Frankenmuth’s priority dispute with Defendant Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF). The Court of Appeals held that Wendy Edenburn was not domiciled with her father, Frankenmuth’s insured, on the date of her motor vehicle crash.
As of the date of her crash, Wendy Edenburn had been living in a camper on property owned by her father, Russell Edenburn, for approximately one month. Wendy owned her own house next door to her father, but Wendy’s daughter—with whom Wendy did not get along—and Wendy’s daughter’s family had “taken over” Wendy’s home and effectively kicked her out. During the time in which Wendy lived in the camper, she still received mail at her own house; she did not make any rent or other payments to Russell; she showered and stored food at Russell’s house, but kept other possessions at her own house; and Wendy’s dog spent its time either in the camper or at the house she owned—never at Russell’s, where it was not allowed. Wendy did not have no-fault insurance of her own at the time of the accident, and thus sought PIP benefits following the accident from Frankenmuth, Russell’s insurer. Frankenmuth paid Wendy’s benefits for a time, but later filed a declaratory action against the MAIPF, arguing that Wendy was not domiciled with Russell at the time of the accident and therefore not entitled to PIP benefits from Frankenmuth. The trial court agreed with Frankenmuth, granting summary disposition in its favor.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order, holding that Wendy was not domiciled with Russell at the time of the accident as a matter of law. The Court noted, preliminarily, that domicile determinations under MCL 500.3114 are made by applying the factors set forth in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Insurance Exchange, 404 Mich 477 (1979) and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675 (1983). The Workman factors include
“(1) [T]he subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his ‘domicile’ or ‘household’; (2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging ‘residence’ or ‘domicile’ in the household.”
The Dairyland factors are
“(1) [T]he person’s mailing address; (2) whether the person maintains possessions at the insured’s home; (3) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s driver’s license and other documents; (4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the insured’s home; and (5) whether the person is dependent upon the insured for financial support or assistance.”
The Court of Appeals wrote that “the first Workman factor was essentially dispositive of this case,” because (1) a person can only have one domicile at a time, and (2) a new domicile can only be established by moving into a new, permanent abode. Stated differently, “a [new] domicile is not established when someone changes residences for a temporary purpose,” which is precisely what Wendy did when she moved into the camper.
“The first Workman factor was essentially dispositive of this case. The evidence shows that Wendy only intended to reside in the camper temporarily until she could move into a new home; further, that is exactly what occurred. Moreover, Wendy did not intend to reside in the camper for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, but only until the cabin was habitable. Grange Ins Co, 494 Mich at 493. Without any evidence that Wendy intended to make the camper her new domicile, the trial court correctly determined that her previous domicile had not been terminated, notwithstanding that Wendy did not intend to return to it until her daughter’s family had moved out. Id. at 494.”
Applying the other Workman and Dairyland factors, nonetheless, the Court found that the second Workman factor weighed in favor of the MAIPF because Wendy and Russell’s relationship was ‘informal and friendly.’ The Court found that the third Workman factor weighed in favor of the MAIPF because the camper was located on Russell’s property. The Court found that the fourth Workman factor, the first Dairyland factor and the third Dairyland factor weighed in favor of Frankenmuth because Wendy had her own home next door where she received her mail. The Court found that the second Dairyland factor was neutral because Wendy kept possessions both at her home and Russell’s. The Court found that the fourth Dairyland factor weighed in favor of Frankenmuth because there was no evidence that the camper was maintained for Wendy’s use, specifically. And lastly, the Court found that the fifth Dairyland factor weighed in favor of Frankenmuth because Wendy had her own job and was not dependent on Russell. Tallying these factors, the Court held that “there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Wendy was domiciled with Russell at the time of the accident. The trial court correctly held that she was not[.]”
