Jordan v Allstate Ins Co (COA – UNP 7/27/2023; RB #4616)
Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #361116; Unpublished
Judges Gadola, Murray, and Maldonado; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEX:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEX:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) motion for summary disposition, in which Allstate sought dismissal of Plaintiff Keisha Jordan’s action for unpaid no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals found a question of fact as to whether Jordan was domiciled with her grandparents, Allstate’s insureds, at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident.
Keisha Jordan was injured in a motor vehicle accident in December 2019, after which she sought PIP benefits from Allstate under a policy issued to her grandparents. Allstate denied Jordan’s claim, and in December 2020, Jordan filed suit. In her deposition, Jordan initially testified that she had moved into an apartment and out of her grandparents’ house in September of 2019, but then corrected herself and maintained, adamantly, throughout the rest of the deposition that she was still living with her grandparents on the date of the accident. Jordan’s grandmother, meanwhile, testified that Jordan was not living at her house on the date of the accident; moreover, a lease agreement between Jordan and the apartment complex provided that the term of Jordan’s lease was September 1, 2019 to August 31, 2020. Based on this evidence, Allstate moved for summary disposition, arguing that there was no question of fact that Jordan was not domiciled with her parents at the time of the accident for purposes of MCL 500.3114. The trial court disagreed, denying Allstate’s motion based on the testimony of Jordan, herself.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Allstate’s motion, holding that Jordan’s testimony—even if weak when compared to her grandmother’s testimony and the lease agreement—was sufficient to create a question of fact as to her domicile at the time of the accident. With respect to the lease, specifically, the Court noted that “it’s possible that plaintiff did not move until after the lease began, and it’s also possible the lease was modified or revoked.” Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that the lease was “[p]erhaps the most compelling evidence supporting defendant’s position”; however, the Court also noted that it is not appropriate to weigh the strength of competing evidence at the summary disposition stage.
“The most important evidence supporting plaintiff’s position that she did not move until after the accident was her testimony to that effect. Plaintiff repeatedly testified that she was certain she still lived with her grandparents at the time of the accident. She was insistent in her position that a significant amount of time elapsed between the accident and the move. It is true that plaintiff initially testified that she moved in September 2019, approximately three months before the accident, and while she did express significant uncertainty regarding the exact date of the move, she did not waver when asked if she lived at her apartment yet at the time of the accident. A rational jury could find that plaintiff had difficulty remembering exact dates, but her mind did not have difficulty remembering the timing of significant events in her life in relation to one another.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence supporting defendant’s position that plaintiff moved before the accident was a lease agreement between her and the Brookwood apartments that indicated a term of September 1, 2019 until August 31, 2020. However, plaintiff was not asked any questions about this lease during her deposition, and there was no testimony from any employees of the Brookwood apartments. Based on the record as it currently exists, it’s possible that plaintiff did not move until after the lease began, and it’s also possible the lease was modified or revoked. While this lease could very well be persuasive to a jury, there are too many open questions for it to be deemed definitive at this stage in the litigation. The other evidence supporting defendant’s assertion that plaintiff moved before the accident was the testimony of plaintiff’s grandmother, Joyce Jordan. It is true that Joyce testified that plaintiff had moved out before December 2019. However, it is also true that Joyce knew very little about the accident and could not say with any certainty when plaintiff left or where she went after she left. The lease and the testimony of Joyce Jordan are both relevant for credibility and weight, but those are not matters to be decided at summary disposition. See Pioneer, 301 Mich App at 377.”
