Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #360647; Unpublished
Judges Shapiro, Borrello, and Yates; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification of Uninsured Owners / Operators for Noneconomic Loss [§3135(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Robert Whitney’s auto-negligence action against Defendant Neal Marvin Wilcoxson. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Whitney was “operating” his uninsured vehicle at the time Wilcoxson crashed into him, such as would preclude Whitney from recovering noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c).
Robert Whitney’s uninsured vehicle died while he was driving on the highway, forcing him to idle to the shoulder area adjacent the highway. While Whitney sat motionless in his now-disabled vehicle, a semi-truck driven by Neal Marvin Wilcoxson crashed into Whitney’s vehicle, causing Whitney to sustain severe injuries. Whitney proceeded to file an auto negligence action against Wilcoxson, but Wilcoxson moved for summary disposition, arguing that Whitney was precluded from recovering noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c) because he was operating an uninsured vehicle which he owned at the time of the crash. At issue, specifically, was whether Whitney was still ‘operating’ his vehicle for purposes of the statute as he sat in it on the side of the highway. The trial court found that he was, “because his ‘car would not have been hit had he not been operating the vehicle on a highway [prior to it dying].’ ”
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order, holding that a question of fact existed as to whether Whitney was ‘operating’ his vehicle at the time of the crash for purposes of MCL 500.3135(2)(c). The Court noted that MCL 500.3135(2)(c)’s preclusive language is only triggered if two elements are satisfied: “[f]irst, the party [must have been] ‘operating his or her own vehicle at the time the injury occurred[,]’ ” and, “[s]econd, the party [must not have had] in effect for that motor vehicle the security required by section 3101(1) at the time the injury occurred.’ ” In this case, there was no question that Whitney’s vehicle was uninsured, but there was a question as to whether he was still ‘operating’ his vehicle for purposes of the statute as he sat in it after it had died on the side of the highway.
“That leaves us with the plain language of MCL 500.3135(2)(c), which obligates defendants to show that plaintiff was operating his own vehicle at the time his injury occurred. The trial court explained that plaintiff’s ‘car would not have been hit had he not been operating the vehicle on a highway[,]’ so ‘[t]he fact that it was . . . motionless on the side of the road at the time it was hit, I don’t believe makes any difference under the case law as I understand it to be.’ That reasoning cannot be squared with the requirement that plaintiff ‘was operating his . . . vehicle at the time the injury occurred.’ MCL 500.3135(2)(c) (emphasis added). Thus, we must reverse the trial court’s award of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and remand the case to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
