Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 344978; Unpublished
Judges Kelly, Kelly, and Servitto; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion; Link to Dissent
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Allowable Expenses: Reasonable Charge Requirement [§3107(1)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this majority unpublished per curiam decision concerning a first-party action to recover no-fault PIP benefits (K. F. Kelly, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, Marina Soliman. The Court of Appeals first ruled that Soliman was not required to present a billing witness from each of her medical providers to testify as to the reasonableness of the charges in the medical bills she submitted to the jury. Soliman relied on the testimony of only a fraction of her treatment providers in support of her contention that the charges in her medical bills were reasonable, which the Court of appeals determined was sufficient to support a legitimate inference that all the charges she submitted were reasonable. The Court of Appeals also ruled that Soliman did have standing to pursue PIP benefits that she assigned to one of her treatment providers after filing this lawsuit, pursuant to MCR 2.202(B).
At trial, Soliman submitted bills from ten different medical providers, and the jury returned a verdict awarding her exactly the amounts claimed, but reduced the allowable expenses attributed to one of the providers, Michigan Head and Spine and premier MRI, from $16,410.00 to $2,250.00. The verdict form did not indicate the reason for the reduction, but the only billing-specific witness Soliman presented was from Michigan Head and Spine and Premier MRI. Thus, the defendant, Home-Owners Insurance Company, argued that if it had the opportunity to cross-examine billing-specific witnesses from Soliman’s other providers, the jury might have reduced those amounts as well. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the limited testimony Soliman did rely on—from only a few of her providers and the one billing-specific witness—was sufficient to support a legitimate inference that all of her charges were reasonable.
In sum, because Soliman was not required to provide specific witnesses to support the reasonableness of the charges in the medical bills that she relied on, we reject defendant’s argument that a specific billing witness was required for each. Like the Kallabat Court, we conclude that the physicians’ trial testimony that their charges were reasonable could support a legitimate inference that the related charges were also reasonable, and that Soliman’s presentation of itemized bills that permitted the jury to scrutinize each expense was sufficient evidence to survive a directed-verdict motion in this regard. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s entry of the judgment reflecting the jury’s verdict awarding these allowable medical expenses.
Home-Owners also argued on appeal that reversal of one portion of the reward was required because it related to PIP benefits that Soliman had assigned to one of her providers, thereby stripping her of standing to pursue those benefits. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the assignment at issue, however, was executed after Soliman filed her lawsuit, and that MCR 2.202(B) did give her standing to pursue even a claim that she ultimately went on to assign to her provider.
Justice Kelly dissented, agreeing with Home-Owners that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of medical bills without affording it the opportunity to cross-examine the “billers” as to the reasonableness of the charges. Justice Kelly further agreed with Home-Owners that Soliman did not have standing to pursue claims that she had assigned to her provider.
Importantly, the assignment at issue here—an assignment from Soliman to Spine Specialists that is dated October 2, 2017—was executed after Soliman filed this lawsuit. The Michigan Court Rules squarely address such an assignment. Specifically, MCR 2.202(B) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
If there is a change or transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party in his or her original capacity, unless the court, on motion supported by affidavit, directs that the person to whom the interest is transferred be substituted for or joined with the original party, or directs that the original party be made a party in another capacity.
No motions for substitution, joinder, or imposition of a different capacity were Consequently, interpreting and applying MCR 2.202(B) according to its plain and ordinary meaning, Soliman was entitled to continue pursuing this lawsuit in her name. See In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich App 436, 446; 861 NW2d 303 (2014) (“The language of the court rule itself is the best indicator of intent. If the plain and ordinary meaning of a court rule’s language is clear, judicial construction is not necessary.”).
