Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 348000; Unpublished
Judges Beckering, Sawyer, and Gadola; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Discovery in Auto Liability Cases
Evidentiary Issues
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of the defendant, Paul Carroll, and the trial court’s order denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The trial court granted Carroll’s motion for summary disposition before the close of discovery in the underlying third-party automobile negligence action, but the Court of Appeals held that it did not do so prematurely because the plaintiff did not submit any evidence to dispute Carroll’s evidence, but rather argued only that further discovery could lead to evidence in support of his claim. At the time the trial court granted Carroll’s motion for summary disposition, the plaintiff had not yet presented any independent evidence in support of his claim, or to establish that further discovery presented a fair likelihood that he would uncover independent evidence in support of his claim.
Perry Charleston was injured after one of Carroll’s wheels became detached from his vehicle, flew over the highway median wall, and struck Charleston’s vehicle. Charleston thereafter filed a complaint against Carroll alleging, among other things, that Carroll failed to keep his vehicle in reasonable repair. More specifically, Charleston alleged that, as a result of Carrol’s negligence, the tire and wheel snapped of his vehicle and flew into Charleston’s. Carroll moved for summary disposition before the close of discovery, and attached an affidavit in which he asserted that he had no knowledge or warning of a problem with his tire or wheel. Charleston filed a response arguing that Carroll’s motion was premature, but the trial court granted Carroll’s motion nonetheless, and further, denied Charleston’s motion for reconsideration, to which he attached Carroll’s deposition transcript and argued that the transcript revealed new and relevant information.
On appeal, Charleston first argued that the trial court prematurely granted summary disposition and prevented him from conducting further discovery in an effort to support his claim. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that Charleston never submitted any evidence to dispute Carroll’s evidence that he was not negligent, and only argued that further discovery could lead to evidence in support of his claim.
The court did not err in granting summary disposition. Although the summary disposition order was granted before the close of discovery, plaintiff presented no independent evidence to establish that further discovery presented a fair likelihood of uncovering factual support. At the time the court granted summary disposition, plaintiff’s argument that summary disposition was premature rested on the fact that the parties had not yet been deposed and plaintiff had not had the opportunity to inspect defendant’s vehicle. However, when the court heard oral arguments, the parties had been deposed. Moreover, plaintiff had previously been aware that defendant possessed the Sebring as indicated by plaintiff in his July 16, 2018 response brief, in which he stated that he had not yet inspected the vehicle. Nonetheless, the vehicle had not been inspected at the time of the motion hearing. Defendant submitted an affidavit contending that he had no knowledge of an issue with the tire and wheel and no reason to believe there was a problem until immediately before the tire detached. Plaintiff submitted no evidence to dispute defendant’s evidence. Plaintiff merely argued that further discovery could lead to evidence to support plaintiff’s position. Thus, plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that the order granting summary disposition was premature.
Charleston next argued that the trial court erred in granting Carroll’s motion for summary disposition because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Carroll was negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Court of Appeals again disagreed, reasoning:
In regard to the first element, “the fact that the injury complained of does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence must either be supported by expert testimony or must be within the common understanding of the jury.” Woodward, 473 Mich at 7 (citation and quotation marks omitted). A lay jury could likely determine that lug nut stems do not ordinarily break off a vehicle instantaneously and with no notice, causing a tire and wheel to detach from a moving vehicle, in the absence of negligence. However, although a “plaintiff must establish that the event was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, plaintiff must also produce some evidence of wrongdoing beyond the mere happening of the event.” Pugno, 326 Mich App at 19- 20. Defendant testified that he had not tampered with the lug nuts, tires, or wheels, and he was completely unaware of any problem prior to the accident. Plaintiff produced no evidence to counter defendant’s contentions or establish wrongdoing beyond the mere happening of the event. Thus, plaintiff failed to meet his burden in order to avail himself of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
