Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #s 345859, 346540; Unpublished
Judges Beckering, Borrello, and Kelly; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Owner [§3101(2)(h)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Intervention by Service Providers and Third Party Payors in PIP Claims
SUMMARY:
In these consolidated appeals arising out of a priority dispute in two separate first-party actions, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant’s insured, Barry Little, was not the statutory owner of the motor vehicle the plaintiff was operating when he was injured in the subject collision, even though the vehicle was insured under Little’s policy and Little paid the premiums. The vehicle was owned and originally insured by the plaintiff, Little’s brother-in-law, but Little put the vehicle on his policy and assumed responsibility for the premium payments when the plaintiff and his wife began experiencing financial hardship. Moreover, Little and the plaintiff both used and had their own set of keys to the vehicle. At the time of the subject collision, however, the plaintiff and his wife had relocated and Little no longer had access to the vehicle. Thus, even though the vehicle was still insured under Little’s policy and Little paid the premiums, the Court of Appeals determined that he was not a statutory owner of the vehicle and that his insurer, State Farm, was not first in priority for paying no-fault PIP benefits for the treatment of the plaintiff’s injuries.
The subject motor vehicle collision occurred on June 24, 2017, and resulted in serious injuries to the plaintiff, Elmer Huziak, Jr., and his two sons. Huziak was driving a Ford Taurus that was titled and registered in his name, but insured under his brother-in-law’s policy with State Farm. Huziak and his sons received treatment for their injuries at the University of Michigan Hospital, and incurred $249,219.52 in unpaid medical bills. They assigned their rights to no-fault PIP benefits to the hospital, and shortly thereafter, both Huziak and the Regents of the University of Michigan filed separate actions against State Farm to collect no-fault PIP benefits. State Farm moved for summary disposition in each action, arguing that, although the vehicle was insured under the policy it provided to Barry Little, Little was not the vehicle’s statutory owner, and State Farm was, therefore, not the priority payer of no-fault benefits.
Huziak and his family moved in with Little approximately four years prior to the subject motor vehicle collision after Huziak began experiencing financial hardship. To alleviate some of that hardship, Little agreed to put Huziak’s Ford Taurus on his insurance policy and pay the premiums himself. Huziak and Little both used the Taurus, and each had their own set of keys. There was some disagreement, however, as to whether they shared the vehicle equally or whether Little had to ask for permission from Huziak in order to drive it. Huziak and his family eventually relocated, and although Little no longer used the Taurus, he kept it on his insurance policy and continued to pay the premiums. Approximately one year after Huziak relocated, he and his sons were injured in the subject motor vehicle collision. Relying on these facts, the trial court granted summary disposition for State Farm, finding that Little was not a statutory owner of the vehicle.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, because the issue “is not whether Little was a statutory owner of the Taurus while and Huziak lived [together], but whether he was a statutory owner at the time of the accident on June 24, 2017.” Even assuming that Little was a statutory owner of the Taurus while he and Huziak lived together, the Court found that his statutory ownership expired when Huziak and his family moved away. Little was no longer using the vehicle at the time of the collision, and the record indicated that their prior arrangement, in which both shared the vehicle while living together, changed after the separation.
The foregoing indicates a change in Huziak’s perception of the nature of Little’s right to use the Taurus after the move to Melvindale. Huziak agreed that Little “didn’t really have use of the vehicle” and that it would not have made sense for Little to use the car in light of the 20-minute distance between Wyandotte and Melvindale. Moreover, Huziak’s assertion that Little could use the Taurus any time he wanted came during questions regarding Huziak’s residence in Wyandotte. Huziak did not make the same claim for the period after he moved to Melvindale. In fact, he acknowledged that Little did not use the Taurus after he moved to Melvindale. Thus, the nature of Little’s right to use the vehicle when it was parked at the Wyandotte address and he was sharing it with a resident relative changed significantly when that relative moved 20 minutes away and took the car with him.
The Regents argues that Little’s retaining a set of keys and maintaining insurance on the car, and Huziak’s insistence that Little could use the car any time he wanted, demonstrate that the nature of Little’s right to use the car did not change after Huziak moved to Melvindale. As indicated above, however, Huziak did not claim that Little could use the Taurus any time he wanted after Huziak moved to Melvindale. On the contrary, Huziak recognized that such use was simply impractical. With regard to insurance, Little testified that he did not change the policy when Huziak moved out because Tonya “had health issues” and he knew she needed a car to drive back and forth to doctors’ appointments. The fact that he discussed the issue with Tonya implies the search for a new reason to continue to insure the Taurus after Huziak’s departure from the Wyandotte address, and his decision indicates that he found that new reason in Tonya’s potential use of the vehicle. Finally, there is some disagreement as to whether Little surrendered his set of keys to Huziak when the latter moved to Melvindale, with Little testifying that he gave his key back to Huziak. Even if we assume that Little kept his set of keys, we are not compelled to interpret this as indicating that the nature of Little’s right to use the car remained the same when Huziak moved to Melvindale because keeping a set of keys might reasonably be as consistent with the possibility of incidental and sporadic usage of the vehicle as with proprietary or possessory usage.
Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to The Regents, the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to State Farm based on its conclusion that no material question of fact existed as to whether Little was a statutory owner of the Taurus at the time of the accident. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Little had once been a statutory owner, Huziak’s move to Melvindale did more than usher in changes in Little’s pattern of usage, it affected the agreement that gave rise to the nature of Little’s right to use the car. If Little’s use of the Taurus satisfied the requirements of MCL 500.3101(2)(l)(i) while he and Huziak lived together at the Wyandotte address, the arrangement they had ceased to exist after Huziak moved to Melvindale. The record evidence simply does not support as reasonable a factual conclusion that Little’s right to use of the Taurus comported with the concepts of ownership. Ardt, 233 Mich App at 690.
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “even if Little was not a statutory owner of the Taurus, State Farm is still liable for the payment of no-fault benefits because it insured the Taurus,” finding that the plaintiffs were conflating coverage under the no-fault act with priority under the no-fault act.
While it is true that Huziak is not excluded from receiving no-fault benefits because Little maintained insurance on the Taurus, The Regents improperly conflates “coverage under the nofault act with priority under the no-fault act.” Id. at __ n 61; slip op at 21 n 61. According to the applicable priority scheme set out in MCL 500.3114(5), a person injured in a motor vehicle accident may claim no-fault personal protection benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
(b) The insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
Huziak was the owner, registrant, and operator of the vehicle involved in the June 24, 2017 motor vehicle accident at issue, but he is not named in the State Farm policy maintained by Little. Accordingly, State Farm does not fall within the order of priority set forth in MCL 500.3114(5), and is not liable for the payment of no-fault benefits. Thus, the argument that State Farm is liable for the payment of no-fault benefits based merely on the fact that it insured the Taurus under the policy maintained by Little fails.
