Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 344221; Unpublished
Judges Beckering, Cavanagh, and Ronayne Krause; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Unreasonably Parked Vehicles [§3106(1)(a)]
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision involving a motorcycle accident, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff Citizens’ declaratory action was properly dismissed, and that the motorcyclist was entitled to PIP benefits as a matter of law under the unreasonably parked vehicle provisions of MCL 500.3106(1)(a), because the subject parked vehicle’s door was unreasonably and dangerously opened in a manner that caused it to protrude into the motorcyclist’s lane of travel.
The defendant, Eugene D. Wright, and two friends were each driving their respective motorcycles down a roadway when Wright crashed into the just-opened door of a vehicle parked illegally on the side of the road. Wright applied for PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, which assigned Wright’s claims to Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest. Citizens denied payment of benefits to Wright, arguing that the subject collision was a motorcycle accident under MCL 500.3101(2)(g), not a motor vehicle collision under MCL 500.3105, and that the collision did not meet any of the parked vehicle exceptions under MCL 500.3106. Citizens then filed a complaint for declaratory relief, asserting the same. The trial court denied Citizens complaint, and held that the collision qualified for the motor vehicle exception 500.3106(1)(a) because the vehicle was parked in such a manner so as to cause unreasonable risk of injury. For that reason, the trial court also held that Wright was entitled to no-fault PIP benefits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Citizens’ complaint for declaratory relief and its holding that Wright was entitled to no-fault PIP benefits. In so holding, the court found that the door was not “equipment” attached to the vehicle under the meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(b), but was rather was an actual constituent part of the vehicle itself. And, once it was opened and protruded into the roadway, the vehicle, itself, became unreasonably and dangerously parked under the meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(A).
Nevertheless, as we have alluded to, Patterson did not merely park illegally in a “no standing” zone. Again, the door of a vehicle is not “equipment,” but rather it is a constituent part of the vehicle itself. Frazier, 490 Mich at 384-386. As a consequence, when Patterson opened the door, the vehicle itself was now protruding into the lane of travel. Thus, Patterson might have been parked in an unreasonably dangerous manner irrespective of whether he was parked illegally. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that he was indeed parked in an unreasonably dangerous manner.
. . .
Clearly, the mere fact that part of a vehicle protrudes into the lane of travel is not, by itself, enough to constitute an unreasonable risk of bodily injury. The fact that people routinely and safely enter and exit vehicles parked alongside the road by opening driver’s-side doors is a well-established phenomenon. Critical to the analysis, however, is whether that protrusion would be realistically avoidable by approaching traffic. Thus, the inquiry turns on situational factors such as the ambient illumination in the area, the posted speed limit, any limitations on sight distance, and, especially importantly to this case, the immediate proximity of any moving vehicles. We accept plaintiff’s argument that at 9:30 p.m. in August, it likely would not have been completely dark. However, it is a matter of public record that it was approximately half an hour after sunset; and, in an urban area with unknown cloud cover, the illumination likely also was not ideal. Most importantly, however, Patterson clearly did not check for nearby vehicles before opening his door. Opening a car door directly into immediately oncoming traffic unambiguously creates an unreasonable risk of bodily injury. The evidence clearly shows that defendant did not have adequate time to avoid the unreasonable risk of bodily injury caused by Patterson’s manner of parking his vehicle. Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that defendant is entitled to no-fault benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3106(1)(a).
