Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 349915; Unpublished
Judges Tukel, Servitto, and Beckering; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Applicability of Comparative Fault to Noneconomic Loss Claims [§3135(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s third-party action for noneconomic damages and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff, Shayma Hassoon, was more than 50% at fault for the subject motor vehicle collision.
Hassoon was involved in a motor vehicle collision while driving on a service drive that runs adjacent to the highway. As she approached the juncture of the highway exit ramp lane and the highway, she stopped at a stop sign, and then proceeded ahead, only to immediately collide with a motor vehicle being driven by Nilya Abdullah. Hassoon subsequently filed a third-party action for negligent operation of a motor vehicle against Abdullah, arguing that the collision was caused as a result of Abdullah “trying to take a sharp right onto Eliot Street by crossing over the solid white lines on the exit ramp lane and into plaintiff’s lane.” Furthermore, Hassoon testified at her deposition that she did not see Abdullah’s vehicle prior to the collision, or that if she did, it was only seconds before it hit her. Abdullah moved for summary disposition however, arguing, among other things, that Hassoon failed to remain stopped at the stop sign at the juncture of the exit ramp and the service drive and yield to oncoming traffic from the exit ramp. The trial court ultimately granted Abdullah’s motion, holding that no reasonable juror could conclude that Hassoon was less than 51% responsible for the collision given her failure to stop and yield at the stop sign.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order, holding that a reasonable juror could conclude that Abdullah was more than 50% at-fault for the collision if, in fact, she crossed over the solid white lines that separated the exit ramp lane from the service drive lane in which Hassoon was traveling. Thus, the fact that Hassoon had a duty to come to a complete stop and yield to oncoming traffic may not have been dispositive of the comparative negligence analysis, especially considering the peculiar configuration of the juncture.
It is undisputed that plaintiff had a duty to come to a complete stop at the stop sign, and she testified that she did come to a complete stop. However, as the images of the exit ramp lane plaintiff attached to her brief to this Court show (Ex 8a and Ex 34a), the exit ramp lane does not disappear by merging into one of the existing lanes of Chrysler Drive. Instead, it continues as an independent lane that drivers can remain on at least until they reach Mack Avenue. Although Chrysler Drive appears to be two (or three) lanes before the stop sign, the exit ramp lane becomes the fourth lane of Chrysler Drive beyond where the two white lines separating the exit ramp lane from the other Chrysler Drive lanes come to a point. From that point forward, dotted lines separate the four lanes. Given that cars coming down the exit ramp can stay in their lane without moving right into another of Chrysler Drive’s lanes, the question is, if plaintiff came to a complete stop at the stop sign and saw that the way in front of her was clear, was it not reasonable for her then to proceed in her lane? This question goes to the nature of plaintiff’s duty to yield and defendant’s purported right of way. Given the configuration of the road, reasonable jurors could disagree with the court’s finding that plaintiff had to expect defendant to cut across the solid white lines separating the exit ramp lane from the other Chrysler Drive lanes.
In addition, because the trial court did not expressly address defendant’s fault, it is difficult to tell whether the court considered any of defendant’s acts negligent. Defendant denied crossing the two white lines at the location plaintiff indicated on Ex. 8a, saying that it would have been “illegal” to do so. Although we have found no express statutory prohibition against crossing the lines indicated, the fact that defendant thought doing so was “illegal” suggests that a reasonably minded juror could find that defendant’s action was at least negligent under the circumstances and that her negligence significantly contributed to the accident.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that, insofar as the trial court was “swayed by defendant’s argument that nothing she did after she came down the exit ramp was relevant because pulling forward at a stop sign without properly yielding to oncoming traffic with the right of way is a traffic violation,” the trial court’s ruling was erroneous.
Defendant was entitled to assume that plaintiff was going to stop at the stop sign. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff did stop at the stop sign. Even if plaintiff negligently proceeded to drive forward, a reasonable juror could conclude from defendant’s testimony that she saw plaintiff’s car in her side and rearview mirrors, and that she could have avoided the accident had she simply stayed in the exit ramp lane rather than merging into plaintiff’s lane, but she negligently failed to do so.
