Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 342061; Unpublished
Judges Cameron, Markey, and Borrello; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Owner [§3101(2)(h)]
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [§3113(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Insurable Interests in Motor Vehicles
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam opinion, summary disposition for defendants was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether plaintiff was disqualified from receiving PIP benefits as an uninsured owner under MCL 500.3113(b) of the No-Fault Act.
The plaintiff in this case was injured in an accident while driving a Hyundai Azera, which the Court described as “his vehicle.” The Hyundai vehicle was also used by plaintiff’s brother on a frequent basis in connection with landscaping business activities conducted by the brother. Neither the brother nor his landscaping company, Pioneer, were listed as owners or registrants of the vehicle. However, the brother procured no-fault insurance for the vehicle under a commercial policy issued by defendant NGM. Following the accident, plaintiff sought no-fault PIP benefits from NGM, as well as defendant Pioneer Insurance—who was the household insurer of plaintiff’s parents’ vehicles. The Progressive policy issued for plaintiff’s parents’ vehicles, however, did not list the Hyundai as an insured vehicle. Although, plaintiff did undisputedly reside with his parents in their home.
Coverage under both policies was initially denied. NGM denied coverage on the basis that the brother’s Pioneer landscaping business did not have an insurable interest in the vehicle, which rendered the NGM policy unenforceable. Progressive then argued that the absence of a valid policy by NGM rendered the vehicle uninsured, which caused the plaintiff to be disqualified under MCL 500.3113(b) as an uninsured owner.
The Court of Appeals held that general issues of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiff’s brother’s landscaping company was a constructive owner of the vehicle with an insurable interest. In so holding, the Court reasoned:
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds could differ regarding the nature of Pioneer’s use of the Azera, such that genuine issues of material fact exist and summary disposition was improper. West, 469 Mich at 183. The question whether there was an insurable interest is generally an issue of law. Morrison, 286 Mich App at 572. However, if there are unresolved material factual questions regarding the underlying circumstances on which the determination of the legal question relies, then it is proper to reserve those issues to the trier of fact. Cf. Farwell v Keaton, 396 Mich 281, 286-287; 240 NW2d 217 (1976) (stating that “[t]he existence of a duty is ordinarily a question of law” but that when there are disputed issues of fact regarding the factual circumstances giving rise to the duty, “they must be submitted to the jury, our traditional finders of fact, for ultimate resolution”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Laier v Kitchen, 266 Mich App 482, 495-496; 702 NW2d 199 (2005) (opinion by NEFF, J.) (explaining that the existence of a duty in the negligence context is usually a question of law for the court but that “if factual questions exist regarding what characteristics giving rise to a duty are present, the issue must be submitted to the fact-finder”). The trial court in the instant case erred by resolving these factual disputes and ruling that there was no insurable interest as a matter of law. Lysorgski, 256 Mich App at 299.
Given the existence of the foregoing questions of fact, the Court of Appeals held that summary disposition was improper.
