Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 345045; Unpublished
Judges Markey, Jansen, and Boonstra; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [§3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for summary disposition seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s first-party action for no-Fault PIP benefits, and remanded for an order granting summary disposition in the defendant’s favor. The plaintiff, Ruth M. Dobrinski, sustained an injury after falling in a parking lot while reaching for her car’s door handle, and the Court of Appeals determined that Dobrinski was not entering her vehicle at the moment she fell and was therefore not entitled to no-fault PIP benefits under MCL 500.3106(1)(c).
Dobrinski was returning to her vehicle in the parking lot of a grocery store when she reached for the door handle on the driver’s side door, got her foot stuck in a small hole in the pavement, fell and suffered an injury. She never actually touched the vehicle prior to falling, yet she sought PIP benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company arguing that she was entering her vehicle at the time of her fall and was therefore entitled to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3106(1)(c). State Farm unsuccessfully moved for summary disposition, as the trial court determined that a factual issue remained as to whether Dobrinski was in the process of entering her vehicle at the time of her fall.
On appeal, State Farm argued that the trial court erred by concluded that there were outstanding questions of fact as to whether Dobrinski was entering her vehicle at the time she fell, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court noted that while Dobrinski was merely preparing to enter her vehicle when she fell; she had not yet actually begun to enter. Moreover, the Court noted that “intent to enter a vehicle is insufficient to warrant coverage under MCL 500.3106(1)(c).”
In this case, plaintiff had not entered, or begun to enter, her vehicle. Indeed, she was merely preparing to enter her vehicle when she fell. After plaintiff placed her purchases on the front passenger seat of her car, plaintiff closed the driver’s side door and walked away. She did not start her car, or leave the door open. Plaintiff had not yet reached her car when she fell, and never touched her car after leaving to return the shopping cart. Clearly, plaintiff intended to enter into her vehicle, but intent to enter a vehicle is insufficient to warrant coverage under MCL 500.3106(1)(c). See McCaslin v Hartford Accident & Indemnity, 182 Mich App 419, 422; 452 NW2d 834 (1990), where this Court concluded that “the express language of [MCL 500.]3106(1)(c) does not address the intent of the injured person.”
