Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 346598; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Swartzle, and Cameron; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion; Link to Dissent
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Independent (Insurance) Medical Examinations
SUMMARY:
In this majority unpublished per curiam decision (Murray, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s tortious interference with a contract claim. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiff, Ashley Granados-Moreno, was barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dyer v. Trachtman, 470 Mich. 45 (2004) from bringing a tortious interference with a contract claim against the doctor who performed her IME and whose diagnoses prompted Granados-Moreno’s automobile insurer to deny her claim for no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Dyer Court simply did not “address whether a party can bring a tortious interference with a contract claim against an individual who conducts an IME, and the Dyer Court did not hold that plaintiffs are barred from bringing claims in relation to a medical professional’s conclusions and opinions following an IME.”
Granados-Moreno was injured in a motor vehicle collision and filed a claim for PIP benefits with her automobile insurer, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company. At the request of Progressive, Granados-Moreno underwent an “independent medical examination” performed by a licensed chiropractor, Dr. Robert Facca. Dr. Facca concluded that while Granados-Moreno’s neck pain and headaches were “causally related” to the underlying motor vehicle collision, she was exaggerating her symptoms and did not need further treatment. On the basis of Dr. Facca’s IME, Progressive suspended payment of Granados-Moreno’s PIP benefits. After a settlement was reached in Granados-Moreno’s subsequent first-party action against Progressive, she filed a complaint against Dr. Facca, alleging, among other things, tortious interference with a contract. Dr. Facca moved for summary disposition, arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dyer barred plaintiffs from attempting to hold IMEs liable for their opinions. The trial court ultimately granted Dr. Facca’s motion, finding Dyer to be dispositive of the issue.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order, holding that the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that Grandados-Moreno could not pursue a tortious interference with a contract claim against an IME. With regard to Dyer, the Court noted that Dyer concerned a medical malpractice claim against an IME, and at no point addressed whether a plaintiff can bring a tortious interference with a contract claim against an IME.
In granting Dr. Facca’s motion for summary disposition on the tortious interference claim, the trial court relied on our Supreme Court’s holding in Dyer. However, the holding in Dyer is inapplicable to Granados-Moreno’s tortious interference claim because the issue in Dyer was whether an examinee can assert a medical malpractice claim against a physician who performs an IME given that a traditional physician-patient relationship does not exist in such a context. Dyer, 470 Mich at 48-55. At no point did the Dyer Court address whether a party can bring a tortious interference with a contract claim against an individual who conducts an IME, and the Dyer Court did not hold that plaintiffs are barred from bringing claims in relation to a medical professional’s conclusions and opinions following an IME. Because the trial court improperly relied on the holding in Dyer, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of Dr. Facca on Granados-Moreno’s tortious interference with a contract claim.
Additionally, although not outcome determinative, we agree with Granados-Moreno that our Supreme Court’s statement in Dyer that “[t]he IME physician, acting at the behest of a third party, is not liable to the examinee for damages resulting from the conclusions the physician reaches or reports,” is dictum. As already stated, at issue in Dyer was whether an examinee can assert a medical malpractice claim against a physician who performs an IME given that a traditional physician-patient relationship does not exist in such a context. Dyer, 470 Mich at 48- 55. The Dyer Court ultimately concluded that “an IME physician has a limited physician-patient relationship with the examinee that gives rise to limited duties to exercise professional care.” Id. at 49. In reaching this conclusion, the Dyer Court noted that an IME physician’s relationship with an examinee is “limited” in that “[i]t does not involve the full panoply of the physician’s typical responsibilities to diagnose and treat the examinee for medical conditions.” Id. at 50. Based on this observation, the Dyer Court indicated that “[t]he IME physician, acting at the behest of a third party, is not liable to the examinee for damages resulting from the conclusions the physician reaches or reports.” Id. Rather, the limited relationship only “imposes a duty on the IME physician to perform the examination in a manner not to cause physical harm to the examinee.” Id. Given that the Dyer Court’s statement that “[t]he IME physician, acting at the behest of a third party, is not liable to the examinee for damages resulting from the conclusions the physician reaches or reports,” id. at 50, was an extraneous statement that was “unnecessary to the decision in the case,” we conclude that it was nonbinding dictum, see Carr v City of Lansing, 259 Mich App 376, 383- 384; 674 NW2d 168 (2003).
Justice Murray dissented, arguing that “Dyer’s discussion about IME physician liability, though arguably dicta, still provides the most useful guidance from the Supreme Court.” Moreover:
Here, defendant argues that he is not liable to plaintiff because, as an IME physician, he was not liable for the results he reported after the IME. Unlike the plaintiff in Dyer, plaintiff here did not claim any harm or injury after the examination that would suggest defendant did not “conduct the examination in such a way as not to cause harm.” Id. at 53. Nor was there any evidence presented that defendant harmed or injured plaintiff in any way during the IME. Thus, the statement in Dyer, that “[t]he IME physician, acting at the behest of a third party, is not liable to the examinee for damages resulting from the conclusions the physician reaches or reports[],” provides that defendant is not liable to plaintiff simply because she was dissatisfied with the result of his report or the content contained (or not) in the report. Dyer, 470 Mich at 50.
