Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 345932; Unpublished
Judges Cameron, Cavanagh, and Shapiro; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Intervention by Service Providers and Third Party Payors in PIP Claims
SUMMARY:
In this case, a healthcare provider, Michigan Pain Management (MPM), treated and obtained assignments from its patient, Lorrie Wideman, after she was injured in a motor vehicle collision. Both Wideman and MPM filed separate lawsuits against Wideman’s no-fault insurer, American Country Insurance Company (ACIC), to collect unpaid PIP benefits. While MPM’s action against ACIC was pending, Wideman’s separate action went to case evaluation, and both Wideman and ACIC accepted a case evaluation award. ACIC then moved for summary disposition against MPM under MCR 2.116(C)(6), arguing that Wideman had already received payment for MPM’s services in the form of the case evaluation award in her separate lawsuit. The Court of Appeals determined that summary disposition was not proper, however, because MCR 2.116(C)(6) would only have applied if MPM had been a named party in Wideman’s separate suit, which it was not.
Lorrie Wideman was injured in a motor vehicle collision in September 2016 and immediately began receiving treatment from MPM. At each visit, Wideman assigned her rights to collect PIP benefits to MPM. Then, in April 2017, Wideman filed a lawsuit against her no-fault insurer, ACIC, to recover unpaid PIP benefits. While Wideman’s action was pending, MPM filed its own lawsuit against ACIC to recover payment for the treatments it provided to Wideman. MPM’s complaint stated that “[a] civil action between other parties arising out of the transaction or occurrence alleged in the complaint” had been filed in a separate court and provided the case number for that action.
In May 2018, Wideman and ACIC went to case evaluation in their separate action, and each accepted a case evaluation award for $209,666.71. Days later, ACIC moved for summary disposition against MPM under MCR 2.116(C)(6), arguing that Wideman had already received payment for MPM’s services in the form of the case evaluation award in her separate lawsuit. MPM responded that it was not a named party to Wideman’s action and that, given the valid assignments, it was “the sole real party in interest with respect to no-fault benefits relating to [its] services.” The trial court granted summary disposition for ACIC.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court “erroneously concluded that, because the two actions were pursuing the same claim for benefits, the requirements of MCR 2.116(C)(6) were met. The trial court overlooked the rule’s requirement that the moving and opposing parties to the present suit be named as a party in the other suit, a circumstance not present here.” The trial court misinterpreted prior Michigan case law to stand for the proposition that “complete identity of the parties is not necessary.” This, however, only refers to other parties, not the moving defendant and the opposing plaintiff. In other words, in order for the same parties requirement of MCR 2.116(C)(6) to be met, the moving defendant and the opposing plaintiff must be the same in each case.
Thus, longstanding caselaw establishes that the term “same parties” in MCR 2.116(C)(6) refers to the party filing the motion and the party responding to it. Those are the relevant parties that must appear in both actions. The rule that complete identity of the parties is not required only comes into play when one or both of the actions contains an additional party not found in the other. A contrary interpretation of MCR 2.116(C)(6)—where the only requirement is that the claims be substantially similar—would render the term “same parties” mere surplusage. See Casa Bella Landscaping, LLC v Lee, 315 Mich App 506, 510; 890 NW2d 875 (2016) (“Court rules, like statutes, must be read to give every word effect and to avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the [court rule] surplusage or nugatory.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration by Casa Bell Landscaping). But the Supreme Court conditioned MCR 2.116(C)(6)’s applicability on the other action involving the same parties in addition to the same claim, and we must apply “the rule’s plain and unambiguous language as written.” Spine Specialists of Mich, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 317 Mich App 497, 501; 894 NW2d 749 (2016).
Returning to the case at hand, MPM was not a party to Wideman’s action against ACIC in Wayne Circuit Court. The trial court cited the familiar rule that “an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and acquires the same rights as the assignor possessed.” Prof Rehab Assoc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 228 Mich App 167, 177; 577 NW2d 909 (1998). But it does not follow that, after the assignment, an assignee and assignor are treated as the same party with respect to the exercise of those rights. To the contrary, “an assignee of a cause of action becomes the real party in interest with respect to that cause of action, inasmuch as the assignment vests in the assignee all rights previously held by the assignor.” Cannon Twp v Rockford Pub Sch, 311 Mich App 403, 412; 875 NW2d 242 (2015) (emphasis added). In other words, after execution of the assignment, only the assignee may enforce the acquired rights.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that “the trial court made an erroneous finding of fact by concluding that Wideman’s assignments to MPM were all executed after Wideman filed her suit against ACIC and were therefore ‘ineffective.’” However, “the record contains several assignments that preceded Wideman’s suit.” “Therefore,” the Court went on to say:
. . . we need not address whether any post-suit assignments were effective. Given our ruling, we also need not address MPM’s arguments that the two suits do not concern the “same claim” and that the trial court erred in relying on the Wideman’s case evaluation summary in concluding otherwise. Even if the two suits involve the same claim, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6) was erroneous when MPM was not a party to the first action.
Finally, the Court noted that “the no-fault act suggests that the insurer should be held liable to the health care provider under the circumstances presented by this case,” pursuant to section 3112 of the no-fault act.
Under this provision, “if the insurer has notice in writing of a third party’s claim, then the insurer cannot discharge its liability to the third party simply by settling with its insured.” Covenant Med Ctr Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 313 Mich App 50, 53; 880 NW2d 294 (2015), rev’d on other grounds 500 Mich 191.3 Here, ACIC had written notice of MPM’s claim given the complaint filed in Oakland Circuit Court. Despite being aware of that claim, ACIC chose to settle Wideman’s claim for PIP benefits. Pursuant to MCL 500.3112, that the settlement had no effect on MPM’s claim.
