Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 345637; Unpublished
Judges Gleicher, Gadola, and Letica; Per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year-Back Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s first-party action to recover no-fault PIP benefits. The plaintiff, Edward Patton, filed a complaint against the defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, seeking first-party no-fault PIP benefits owed to his deceased mother. At the time Patton filed suit, he had not been appointed as the personal representative of his mother’s estate, but at some point prior to oral arguments, he was named successor personal representative. Farmers argued that it was entitled to summary disposition because Edwards lacked standing to sue when the case was brought, and that any amended pleading would not relate back to the filing date of the complaint. Patton’s claims, Farmers argued, would therefore be barred by the one-year-back rule. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that under the plain language of MCL 700.3701, Patton’s subsequent appointment as personal representative would relate back to the original filing date, and thus his claims would not be barred by the one-year-back rule.
In Patton’s original complaint, he averred that he had been appointed as the personal representative of his mother’s estate. In truth, the estate would not be opened for another six weeks, at which point April Nash, not Patton, would be named as its personal representative. Farmers moved for summary disposition, arguing that Patton lacked standing and the capacity to sue, but conceded prior to oral arguments that Patton had been named as the successor personal representative. In any event, Farmers argued it was entitled to summary disposition because Patton lacked standing to sue when the case was brought and that any amended pleading would not relate back. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Farmers.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order, finding MCL 700.3701 to be “dispositive and directly on point.”
Under the italicized and plain language of MCL 700.3701, Edward’s subsequent appointment as the personal representative of Joyce’s estate relates back to the date Edward filed the complaint, as long as “acts occurring before appointment” benefitted the estate. They did. The complaint tolled the statute of limitations and also preserved the estate’s ability to seek PIP benefits one year back from the date of its filing. See MCL 500.3145(2). Accordingly, Edward’s subsequent appointment as the personal representative of Joyce’s estate relates back to the date he filed the complaint.
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Because the appointment relates back, Edward had standing to bring the estate’s claim and must be permitted to file an amended complaint identifying himself as the successor personal representative. See also MCL 700.3703(3) (“Except as to a proceeding that does not survive the decedent’s death, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state at death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this state and the courts of another jurisdiction as the decedent had immediately prior to death.”).
