Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 343320; Unpublished
Judges Cameron, Cavanagh, and Shapiro; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Fraud/Misrepresentation
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s first-party action to recover no-fault PIP benefits. The plaintiff’s insurer, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, sought to invoke the fraud exclusion provision in the plaintiff’s policy to void the policy ab initio, arguing that the plaintiff, Latrese Hunter, had lied about her residence to obtain a lower premium. The Court of Appeals determined that a question of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff actually did live at the residence listed on her application with Progressive at the time the application was filed.
Latrese Hunter applied for automobile insurance from Progressive and listed her friend’s address in Plymouth, MI as her residence. Hunter was later injured in a motor vehicle collision, and upon admission to the hospital, listed her parent’s address in Detroit as her residence on her medical documents. After her discharge from the hospital, she returned home to live at her parents’ residence in Detroit, and filed a claim for PIP benefits from Progressive. Progressive contacted Hunter’s friend who owned the home in Plymouth, and Hunter’s friend admitted that Hunter had never lived there, but that she had given Hunter permission to use her address because Hunter wanted a lower premium. Progressive thus refused to pay PIP benefits to Hunter, and moved for summary disposition in Hunter’s subsequent first-party action, invoking the fraud exclusion provision in Hunter’s policy. The trial court ultimately granted Progressive’s motion, allowing Progressive to void Hunter’s policy ab initio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Progressive, finding that Hunter presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether she was, in fact, residing at the Plymouth address at the time she applied for insurance with Progressive. For instance, Hunter changed her address on her driver’s license to the Plymouth address before she applied for insurance with Progressive, and had her mailed delivered to the Plymouth address.
Applying the definition of “residence” to the facts of this case, we conclude that there is a question of fact as to whether Hunter “dwell[ed] . . . for some time” and “actually live[d]” at the Plymouth address when she applied for insurance in October 2015. Record evidence supports that Hunter lived at the Plymouth address between October 3, 2015 and April 7, 2016 and that she did not reside at the Detroit address during that time. Hunter changed the address on her driver’s license to the Plymouth address before she applied for insurance through Progressive, and she had mail delivered to her at the Plymouth address. Additionally, evidence supports that Hunter had her own bedroom and kept personal possessions at the Plymouth address. She also had a key to the Plymouth home at one point and paid rent to the homeowner, albeit on an inconsistent basis. Importantly, Hunter was present at the Plymouth address on a daily basis in order to sleep, groom herself, and clean the areas of the home in which she occupied. Although Hunter did not spent a substantial amount of time at the Plymouth address, Hunter’s deposition testimony establishes that she was required to be at the Detroit address on a daily basis because of family obligations. Further, the definition of residence referenced above does not require an individual to spend a majority of his or her time at the home in question; rather, the definition of residence only requires that an individual actually live in and occupy the home.
Progressive presents evidence to support that Hunter never informed the Wayne County Family Court that she was residing at the Plymouth address even though she was required to do so pursuant to a court order4 and that Hunter continued to use the Plymouth address after she moved to the Detroit address after the April 2016 accident. Although we agree that this evidence tends to support that Hunter did not actually live at the Plymouth address and instead used it as a mailing address, this Court cannot make credibility determinations, In re Handelsman, 266 Mich App at 437, and is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing a motion for summary disposition, Smith, 460 Mich at 454. Further, the question of whether an insured has committed fraud is generally a question for the jury to decide. See Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 324 Mich App 467, 473; 922 NW2d 154 (2018).
