Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 344317; Unpublished
Judges Cameron, Cavanagh, and Shapiro; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of the defendant, the City of Detroit, and remanded for further proceedings. At issue was the domicile of Amber Chaplain, who was injured in a motor vehicle collision involving a bus that was owned and insured by the City of Detroit. Chaplain was uninsured at the time of the motor vehicle collision, and the Court of Appeals determined that a question of fact existed as to whether Chaplain was living with her aunt, who was insured, at that time.
After the collision, Chaplain signed an affidavit of no motor vehicle insurance and listed her address as “19698 Spencer.” The house located at that address belonged to Chaplain’s aunt, Carol Chatters, who testified that Chaplain did not live with her at the time of the collision. Chaplain’s medical providers subsequently filed the present action seeking no-fault PIP benefits from the City of Detroit on the basis of assignment, and the City of Detroit moved for summary disposition, which the trial court granted, ruling as a matter of law that Chatters’s insurer was the insurer of highest priority because Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters at the time of the collision.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of the City of Detroit, relying on the factors for determining domicile laid out in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477 (1979), and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Inc Co, 123 Mich App (1983). In Workman, the Supreme Court laid out the following four factors:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his “domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. [Workman, 404 Mich at 496-497 (internal citations omitted).]
And in Dairyland, the Supreme Court laid out the following five factors:
(1) the person’s mailing address; (2) whether the person maintains possessions at the insured’s home; (3) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s driver’s license and other documents; (4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the insured’s home; and (5) whether the person is dependent upon the insured for financial support or assistance. [Williams v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 202 Mich App 491, 494-495; 509 NW2d 821 (1993), citing Dobson v Maki, 184 Mich App 244, 252; 457 NW2d 132 (1990), and Dairyland, 123 Mich App at 682.]
Applying these factors to the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters at the time of the collision. As to the four Workman factors, the Court found that none weighed either for or against a finding that Chatters was domiciled with Chatters at the time of the collision, and that the evidence was conflicting as to each. As to the Dairyland factors, however, the Court noted that the first, second, and third all supported a finding that Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters at the time of the collision.
The first Dairyland factor, a person’s mailing address, supports the conclusion that Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters. Chatters testified that Chaplain received mail at the Spencer Street house. The second Dairyland factor, whether the person maintains possessions at the insured’s home, also supports the conclusion that Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters. Chatters testified that Chaplain kept some personal items in a bedroom at the Spencer Street home. The third Dairyland factor, whether the insured’s address is listed on the individual’s driver’s license and other documents, further supports the conclusion that Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters. Chaplain’s state identification card listed the Spencer Street address.
The Court found the fourth Dairyland factor to be inconclusive, and the fifth to weigh against a finding that Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters at the time of the collision. In light of this conflicting evidence, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that Chaplain was not domiciled with Chatters at the time of the collision.
