Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 339795; 339918; Unpublished
Judges Kelly, Markey, Fort Hood per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (McCormick Era: 2010 – present)[§3135)**]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (McCormick Era: 2010 – present) [§3135(5)**]
General / Miscellaneous [§3135]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals denied summary disposition for Defendant, the City of Detroit’s (“Detroit”), governmental immunity claim. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s denial summary disposition regarding governmental immunity because it found that this case was under the motor vehicle exception and the sudden emergency doctrine did not bar the claim. The Court also upheld the trial court’s denial of summary disposition for Detroit’s claim that Plaintiff Ronald Thompson-Bey (“Thompson-Bey”) failed to meet the tort threshold. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial of Detroit’s motion to dismiss for failing to meet the tort threshold because it found that Thompson-Bey had shown a question of fact regarding his ability to live his normal life after the injury and that the injury had aggravated a pre-existing condition.
Thompson-Bey was a passenger in a bus owned by Detroit and operated by Defendant Leandre Oden (“Oden”), a Detroit employee. The bus collided with a car driven by Tacara R. Donaldson (“Donaldson”). Thompson-Bey testified that the weather was fair that day and the bus was over its capacity (“standing room only”). Thompson-Bey further testified that Oden was driving over the speed limit and “really fast” for a construction zone when the bus collided with Donaldson’s car. Thompson-Bey was standing up holding onto the arm rail when the collision threw him to the bus floor. Thompson-Bey claimed to have suffered a torn rotator cuff and an injured knee resulting from being thrown to the floor. Subsequently, Thompson-Bey brought an action against Detroit and Oden for negligence. Detroit and Oden moved for summary disposition because (1) they had governmental immunity and (2) Thompson-Bey failed to meet the tort threshold for serious impairment of a body function. The lower court denied the motion.
Governmental Immunity
The Court first found that Thompson-Bey was not barred by governmental immunity. While governmental immunity is broad in Michigan, there are several well-defined exceptions to governmental immunity. The relevant exception here is MCL 691.1405, which allows individuals to bring claims for bodily injury or property damage “resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner.” There was no dispute that Oden was a government employee or that the bus was owned by Detroit. Rather, Defendants argued that there was no negligence because of the “sudden emergency doctrine.” Defendants argued that Donaldson pulled out in front of the bus causing a sudden emergency. However, the sudden emergency doctrine cannot be invoked if the defendant was negligent and brought about the sudden emergency. Here, there was evidence that Oden was speeding, and the violation of a statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Because there was evidence that Oden was speeding the Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Oden’s negligence.
“[T]he sudden emergency doctrine would not be applicable where Oden contributed to the unsafe conditions. White, 275 Mich. App at 636. Consequently, where a reasonable jury could find that Oden breached the duty of ordinary care and was negligently operating the City bus, the trial court correctly (1) determined that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity is applicable and (2) denied the City’s motion for summary disposition.”
MCL 500.3135
The Court next found that Thompson-Bey had provided evidence to potentially meet the tort threshold under MCL 500.3135. In McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 195; 795 NW2d 517 (2010), the Supreme Court of Michigan explained that there are three elements that must be met to bring an action under MCL 500.3135 for a serious impairment of body function: “(1) an objectively manifested impairment (2) of an important body function that (3) affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life. Only the objective manifestation and general ability prongs were reviewed in this case.
The Court explained Thompson-Bey presented evidence showing that he suffered a rotator cuff injury following the accident. Further, the plaintiff presented evidence that he required surgery for the injury. Detroit argued that Thompson-Bey had suffered from pain prior to the accident and it produced evidence to that effect. The Court acknowledged that the evidence provided by Detroit demonstrated that Thompson-Bey had pre-existing pain from previous injuries, but the Court found that there was still a genuine issue of material fact. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, the Court explained that a reasonable fact-finder could still find a cause and effect between the bus accident and Thompson-Bey’s subsequent pain and injuries.
Detroit also argued that Thompson-Bey failed to meet the tort threshold because the collision did not impact his general ability to lead his normal life. However, plaintiff provided evidence that following the accident he needed help from his fiancé to drive, get in and out of the bathtub, wipe himself after using the bathroom, do laundry, clean his home, maintain his law, and go shopping. Further, Thompson-Bey testified that his sexual relationship with his fiancé was impacted by his injuries. Considering this evidence, the Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Thompson-Bey’s ability to live his normal life.
“[P]laintiff’s evidence regarding the cause in fact of his injuries was not “mere speculation,” and it created a question of fact for the jury where it “establishe[d] a logical sequence of cause and effect[ ]” with regard to the occurrence of his alleged injuries, even though other plausible theories for plaintiff’s medical conditions and alleged injuries existed. Patrick, 322 Mich App at 617, 620. . . . While the City faults plaintiff for not providing more specific evidence from before the motor vehicle accident concerning the activities that he is now limited in performing, this argument is unavailing where the record evidence, particularly plaintiff’s deposition testimony, is sufficient to allow for “a comparison of [plaintiff’s] life before and after” the December 17, 2015 motor vehicle accident. McCormick, 487 Mich at 202.”
The Court therefore upheld the lower court’s denial of summary disposition because there was a genuine issue of material fact.
