Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 338231; Unpublished
Judges Cameron, Jansen, O’Connell per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Liability for Excess Economic Loss Caused by Insured Tortfeasors [§3135(3)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s grant of summary disposition for Defendant David McCowan (“McCowan”) on the issue of whether McCowan was negligent in operating his vehicle at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals reasoned that McCowan did not have a duty to anticipate a vehicle darting out in front of his own vehicle and when Plaintiff Manushaqe Pasho’s (“Pasho”) vehicle darted out in front of McCowan’s vehicle, McCowan acted with reasonable and due care under those specific facts and circumstances.
On March 5, 2014, Pasho was involved in a traffic accident. Pasho was driving an SUV on Sigler Road and came to a stop at an intersection between Sigler Road and Telegraph Road. Telegraph Road did not have a stop sign and traffic on Telegraph Road had the right of way at the intersection. An eyewitness explained that after Pasho initially stopped at the intersection, she drove out into the intersection in the path of a semi-truck driven by McCowan. McCowan initially saw Pasho driving towards the intersection, but his sight was blocked when she pulled up to the stop sign and he did not see if she actually stopped at the intersection. McCowan assumed Pasho stopped because he was familiar with the intersection. Unfortunately, when Pasho pulled out in front of McCowan’s semi-truck McCowan was caught by surprise. McCowan braked and moved his vehicle into the right side of the road because he was fearful that he would hit other traffic if he moved into the left side of the road. McCowan was unable to stop in time and collided with Pasho, which severely injured Pasho and killed the passenger in the car.
Subsequently, Pasho brought an action against McCowan and his employer U.S. Cargo. Pasho alleged that McCowan had been negligent. Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary disposition. Defendants argued that McCowan did not owe Pasho a duty of care until she darted out in front of him and McCowan did not breach his duty of care in that moment. The trial court granted the McCowan’s motion for summary disposition finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding McCowan’s negligence. The trial court primarily relied on Arnold v Krug, 279 Mich 702; (1937), to show the McCowan did not breach his duty of care. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals found no negligence because there was no proximate cause between McCowan’s actions and Pasho’s injuries. The Court of Appeals first reviewed the elements of negligence: “(1) that Defendant owed them a duty of care, (2) that Defendant breached that duty, (3) that plaintiffs were injured, and (4) that Defendant’s breach caused plaintiffs’ injuries.” The Court then explained that the fourth element “proximate cause” in fact contained two elements: factual causation and legal causation. The Court then reviewed Arnold (the case relied upon by the trial court), which held a defendant was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries when the plaintiff drove his car out in front of a truck driver at an intersection where the truck driver had the right of way. The Court held that in light of Arnold, it was proper for the trial court to hold as a matter of law that McCowan was not negligent. The Court reasoned that it would fundamentally undermine the rapid transit system to expect drivers on a trunk line highway to constantly anticipate that motor vehicles will dart out in front of them. Moreover, Pasho’s conduct was unlawful and there was no evidence to support an inference that McCowan did anything unlawful.
“Although it is reasonably foreseeable that some driver at some intersection with a high-speed, trunk line highway will, at some point, suddenly drive into the path of an oncoming semi-truck that has the right of way, at any given intersection that outcome is not reasonably foreseeable. As Arnold recognized, it is simply not reasonable to expect drivers on trunk line highways to constantly anticipate such behavior from other motorists. See Arnold, 279 Mich at 707-709. And from a policy standpoint, doing so would fundamentally undermine the purpose of the trunk line system (i.e., rapid transit), would “be foreign to the general conception of careful drivers of their rights and duties upon” roadways, would “in large measure destroy the preferential right of way,” and would “offer inducement to drivers approaching on intersection roads to violate their legal duties.” Id. at 707-708.”
Thus, the Court upheld the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in the McCowan’s favor.
