Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 331215; Unpublished
Judges Borrello, M.J. Kelly and Markey; Unanimous, Per Curiam (Judge Markey concurring in the result only)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
Concur in result only
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion involving a priority dispute between no-fault insurers, the Court of Appeals held that summary disposition was proper for plaintiff-Farm Bureau and that defendant-Progressive was the higher priority insurer because the injured party was domiciled with his grandparents, who were insured by Progressive, and had not yet established a new domicile at the time of the accident.
Vern Sehl was injured while walking when he was struck from behind by a motor vehicle. Sehl sought first-party no-fault benefits from Progressive, his grandparents’ insurer. The accident report indicated Sehl’s address was that of his grandparents. Progressive denied Sehl’s claim, asserting he was not domiciled with his grandparents at the time of the accident. Sehl then sought no-fault benefits from Farm Bureau, the insurer of the vehicle that struck him. After paying more than $196,000 to Sehl, Farm Bureau filed this declaratory judgment action, claiming Progressive was the higher priority insurer and seeking reimbursement. Farm Bureau moved for summary disposition, claiming Sehl was indeed domiciled with his grandparents at the time of the accident and, therefore, Progressive was the priority insurer. Progressive responded that Sehl had moved out of his grandparents’ home three or four months before the accident and did not intend to return. The trial court granted summary disposition for Farm Bureau, relying on Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 (2013), where the Michigan Supreme Court held that a person can only have one domicile and that domicile continues until the person establishes a new domicile. According to the trial court, Sehl had established his domicile with his grandparents and, at the time of the accident, he had yet to establish a new domicile even though he had moved out of his grandparents’ home and did not intend to return. On appeal, Progressive claimed the trial court erred in finding that Sehl remained domiciled with his grandparents at the time of the accident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Progressive’s domicile argument, noting that in order to terminate an established domicile, a person must establish a new domicile through a combination of residency and intent. Applying this standard to the present case, the Court said the record, including an affidavit of Sehl, contained “significant evidence” of Sehl’s residency and intent.
Regarding Sehl’s residency and intent, the Court pointed out Sehl said that, at the time of the accident, he had “permanently moved out” of his grandparents’ home to reside with a friend, had “no intention of returning to reside” with his grandparents and was instead residing at “3058 Keystone.” The Court further noted that Sehl’s grandparents testified that 1) Sehl was not living with them on the date of the accident, 2) his bedroom had been converted into a sewing room, 3) his bed was given to a neighbor, and 4) Sehl continued to receive mail at their home.
However, Sehl’s grandmother did not know if he had a physical address to forward his mail to. She thought he might be living in an auto body shop where he worked. She assumed he was homeless because he was “bouncing around.”For all she knew, he was “couch surfing.” Sehl’s grandfather testified that he did not know where Sehl was living. He had also heard that he was living in an auto body shop.
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals stated:
“[I]t is clear that although Sehl no longer planned to permanently reside with his grandparents, he had not yet established a new domicile. He was instead living in various places, including with unknown friends at unknown addresses and at the auto shop where he worked. The transient nature of his living arrangements after moving out of his grandparents’ home does not allow for the inference that he was residing at a new place with the intention to remaining permanently or indefinitely. Because Grange requires an individual to acquire a new domicile in order to terminate his or her prior domicile, we are constrained to find that despite his clear intent to leave his grandparents’ home permanently his domicile nevertheless remained in their home.”
However, Progressive maintained that 1) it was only required to prove that Sehl was no longer domiciled with his grandparents, and not that he had established a new domicile, and 2) the factors in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exchange, 404 Mich 477 (1979), should have been applied to the case. The Court of Appeals denounced both arguments and concluded:
“[I]n this case, we need not apply [the Workman factors] in detail because there is simply no evidence in the record suggesting that Sehl established a new domicile after leaving his grandparents’ home.”
