Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 330808; Unpublished
Judges Riordan, Meter and Fort Hood; Unanimous, Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
Resident Relatives [§3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits could proceed because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff was domiciled with her daughter at the time of the accident and, therefore, she was entitled to coverage under her daughter’s auto insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company.
Plaintiff was seriously injured in a September 14, 2013 bus accident in Ohio. According to plaintiff, who had resided in Louisiana with her husband, she planned to leave her husband and relocate to Michigan from Louisiana in August 2013, and intended to live with her daughter in Michigan. However, plaintiff’s relocation plans were delayed because she had to undergo surgery, and so she remained in Louisiana until September 12, 2013, at which time she boarded a bus to Michigan. The bus was involved in an accident in Ohio and plaintiff was airlifted to Beaumont Hospital, where she remained for several months. She was then moved to a rehabilitation facility, but returned to Beaumont after slipping into a coma. Plaintiff was discharged from Beaumont Hospital in December 2013 and went to live with her son because her daughter’s landlord would not allow the modifications that were needed for her care (wheelchair access and hospital bed). When plaintiff sought no-fault benefits from Allstate, which had issued a no-fault policy to her daughter in Michigan, it denied the claim. Plaintiff filed this action for benefits, claiming she was domiciled with her daughter at the time of the bus accident and entitled to coverage. Beaumont Hospital intervened in the suit, seeking coverage for the medical services it had provided plaintiff. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and Beaumont, finding that plaintiff had “abandoned her domicile in Louisiana to acquire domicile in Michigan at the time she was involved in the accident.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that contrary to Allstate’s claims, the factors for determining domicile set forth in Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675 (1983), and Workman v Detroit Auto Inter–Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477 (1979), must be considered.
According to the Court, the Workman-Dairyland factors are: 1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his “domicile” or “household”; 2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household; 3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises; 4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household; 5) the person’s mailing address; 6) whether the person maintains possessions at the insured’s home; 7) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s driver’s license and other documents; 8) whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the insured’s home; and 9) whether the person is dependent upon the insured for financial support or assistance
The Court of Appeals explained the Workman-Dairyland factors were applied in Williams v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 202 Mich App 491 (1993), a case involving facts “strikingly similar” to the present case. In Williams, an appellate majority held that, based on the Workman-Dairyland factors, plaintiff was domiciled with his parents in Michigan at the time of the auto accident and entitled to coverage under their no-fault policy. The dissent in Williams disagreed, focusing on common law principles that govern domicile and not the Workman-Dairyland factors.
The Court of Appeals continued by addressing Allstate’s argument that the Workman-Dairyland factors should not be considered in light of the dissent in Williams and the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Grange Ins Co of Michigan v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 (2013), where the high court emphasized “traditional common law principles” of domicile. Rejecting Allstate’s argument, the Court of Appeals said:
“Contrary to defendant’s characterization of the opinion, Grange did not invalidate the Workman-Dairyland factors, or otherwise undermine the majority opinion in Williams. … However, defendant fails to recognize that the Michigan Supreme Court … did not generally hold that consideration of the Workman-Dairyland factors is not appropriate in determining an adult’s domicile. To the contrary, the Michigan Supreme Court made it clear throughout Grange that the Workman-Dairyland factors remain relevant and applicable in determining the domicile of an adult whose domicile is not set by operation of law. … Accordingly, there is absolutely no indication in Grange — especially in light of its clear references to the fact that the Workman-Dairyland factors remain relevant and applicable in cases involving an adult whose domicile is not set by operation of law — that the majority opinion in Williams has been overruled or disavowed. Therefore, we reject defendant’s reliance on Grange to contend that the majority opinion in Williams … is no longer valid, and to contend that this Court should apply common law domicile principles without considering the Workman-Dairyland factors. Contrary to defendant’s claims, this Court must consider the Workman-Dairyland factors in determining plaintiff’s domicile at the time of the accident and follow Williams as binding precedent.”
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals said the trial court correctly relied on Williams and concluded that, based on the Workman-Dairyland factors, plaintiff was domiciled in Michigan at the time of the bus accident. The Court noted that “at least three out of the four Workman factors weigh[ed] in favor of a finding that plaintiff was domiciled with” her daughter at the time of the bus accident, and that “[m]ost of the Dairyland factors also weigh[ed] in favor of a finding that plaintiff was domiciled with” her daughter.
Thus, the Court of Appeals held:
“Consistent with … Williams, applying the Workman-Dairyland factors to the undisputed facts in this case shows, as a matter of law, that plaintiff had established her domicile in [her daughter’s] home — and abandoned her domicile in Louisiana — at the time of the accident.”
