Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 332100; Unpublished
Judges Shapiro, Gleicher and O’Brien; Non-Unanimous, Per Curiam (Judge O’Brien dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
Link to Dissenting Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Fraud/Misrepresentation
Uninsured Motorist Benefits
CASE SUMMARY:
In this non-unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held the trial court improperly granted summary disposition for defendant-insurer because, although it presented some evidence from which it could be inferred that plaintiff engaged in fraudulent conduct, the evidence was “well short of resolving the question beyond an issue of material fact such that a reasonable juror could conclude otherwise.”
Plaintiff filed a claim for uninsured motorist benefits with defendant-Allstate, which insured the vehicle that plaintiff was allegedly driving at the time of her accident on January 5, 2012. Allstate paid for repairs to the vehicle and also paid PIP benefits to plaintiff. Plaintiff then brought this action, claiming she suffered a serious impairment of body function under MCL 500.5135 as a result of the crash, and that Allstate breached its duty to pay her uninsured motorist benefits. Allstate moved for summary disposition, asserting there was no question of material fact that plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent conduct with respect to her claim and that, under the policy’s anti-fraud provision, she was precluded from obtaining any further benefits under the policy. The trial court granted summary disposition for Allstate.
On appeal, Allstate contended there was no question that plaintiff engaged in fraud because the sole passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident was plaintiff’s nephew, KT, and he testified at deposition in another case that his father, Kavyn Thomas (plaintiff’s brother) was the driver and the only other occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and not plaintiff. Also, KT’s mother, Crystal Collins, testified at a deposition in the other case that KT was with Kavyn at the time of the accident. However, in a deposition in this case, Kavyn testified that he was not in the vehicle at the time of the accident and that he had been sleeping when KT woke him up and told him about the crash. Allstate also maintained that plaintiff testified in two depositions that she was the driver of the vehicle, and that her name was listed as the driver on the police report.
The Court of Appeals reversed summary disposition for Allstate. According to the Court, based on the evidence, reasonable minds could disagree about whether plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent conduct. In this regard, the Court said:
“In accepting KT’s and Collins’s testimony as conclusive over that of plaintiff’s and Kavyn’s, the trial court resolved a credibility determination in favor of the moving party. This was erroneous. … While a trier of fact may choose to believe KT’s and Collins’ testimony over that of Kavyn’s and [Allstate’s], the trial court was not permitted to resolve that dispute at the summary disposition stage.”
Further, the Court rejected Allstate’s argument that plaintiff engaged in fraud by misrepresenting the nature and extent of her injuries. Based on the record evidence, the Court said that reasonable minds could differ on whether plaintiff’s statements regarding her injuries were “material, false and made with fraudulent intent.”
Accordingly, the Court held that issues of material fact existed and summary disposition should not have been granted for Allstate. Thus, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Judge O’Brien dissented and said:
“In sum, this case requires that this Court determine if reasonable minds could differ as to whether plaintiff made fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with the accident or loss at issue. I would conclude that reasonable minds could not. In my view, plaintiff’s obviously false assertions cannot, reasonably, prevent this conclusion. Accordingly, I would affirm.”
