Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 328553; Published
Judges Stephens, Saad and Meter; Unanimous Opinion by Judge Stephens
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published Opinion by Judge Stephens, the Court of Appeals held that summary disposition was properly granted for defendant-medical providers on Citizens Insurance Company’s suit for reimbursement of benefits that it mistakenly paid, because Citizens’ claim was filed too late and barred by the limitations period in MCL 500.3175(3) since it was an action “to enforce rights to indemnity or reimbursement against a third party.”
William Sullivan was injured in a 2009 auto accident while driving an uninsured pickup truck that was registered to Leonardo Terriquez-Bernal. Sullivan applied for no-fault benefits with the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility (MACF) and his claim was assigned to plaintiff Citizens, which investigated the claim. Citizens determined that Sullivan was entitled to coverage and paid no-fault benefits. In 2012, Citizens filed suit against Terriquez-Bernal for reimbursement of the benefits it had paid and also moved for summary disposition. In response, Terriquez-Bernal submitted an affidavit from Sullivan, which stated:
“2. I purchased the 1999 Ford F150 when it was new and was the title owner until July, 2008, when I sold the vehicle to Defendant Leonard Terriquez-Bernal (“Defendant”) for one dollar.
“3. Essentially, I needed to have the vehicle title in Defendant’s name.
“4. From July, 2008, until August 2, 2009, the date of the accident, I used and possessed the 1999 Ford F150 white truck as if I was the owner.
“5. At the time of the accident, I did not have no fault insurance on the 1999 Ford F150 white truck.”
Citizens then deposed Terriquez-Bernal, who stated that he transferred title and registration of the truck into his name as a favor to Sullivan. Terriquez-Bernal said that, after transferring title and registration into his name, he never took possession of the vehicle, never drove the vehicle and never had keys to the vehicle. Therefore, based on Sullivan’s affidavit and Terriquez-Bernal’s deposition, Sullivan was actually the owner of the uninsured truck and was never entitled to no-fault benefits. Citizens then brought this action against Sullivan and four medical providers who treated Sullivan for his accident-related injuries, seeking reimbursement for payments it made pursuant to its mistaken belief that Sullivan was entitled to no-fault benefits.
Defendants-Oakwood Healthcare and Henry Ford filed motions for summary disposition, arguing that Citizens’ claims were brought too late and were barred by the limitations period in §3175(3). In making this argument, Oakwood Healthcare and Henry Ford maintained that §3175(3) applies to actions by MACF assigned carriers “to enforce rights to indemnity or reimbursement against a third party.” Citizens, however, claimed the six-year statute of limitations in MCL 600.5813 applied, and therefore, its claims were timely filed. The trial court granted summary disposition for Oakwood Healthcare and Henry Ford. Afterward, defendant-University Physician Group (UPG) filed a motion for summary disposition, asserting that Citizens’ claim against it was also barred by the §3175(3) limitations period. The trial court granted UPG’s motion and denied Citizens’ motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Citizens’ claims were untimely filed and barred by the limitations period in §3175(3). Because the terms “indemnity, reimbursement and third party,” although used in §3175(3), are not defined in the statute, the Court looked to definitions of “indemnity,” “reimbursement,” and “third party” in Webster’s New World Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary.
Analyzing Citizens’ complaint in light of these definitions, the Court of Appeals concluded that Citizens’ two counts against defendant-medical providers for “payment under mistake of fact” and “unjust enrichment” stated claims “to enforce rights to indemnity or reimbursement against a third party.” Therefore, because the “gravamen” of Citizens’ action was to “enforce rights” under the No-Fault Act, §3175(3) applied, and the general six-year limitation period in MCL 600.5813 did not apply, the Court said.
The Court of Appeals wrote:
“For the second count, ‘payment under mistake of fact,’ plaintiff in its final paragraph states that it ‘is entitled to reimbursement of the payments made to each of the Defendants to the extent of the amount of benefits paid to each of them.’ … For the fourth count, ‘unjust enrichment,’ plaintiff in its final paragraph states that it ‘paid in excess of $200,000.00 in No Fault benefits to or on behalf of William Ernest Sullivan including loss adjustment costs, attorney fees and interest to which it is entitled to reimbursement.’ … Looking at the complaint and the above definitions related to MCL 500.3175(3), we conclude that the action filed by plaintiff is one ‘to enforce rights to indemnity or reimbursement against a third party.’ … Plaintiff paid defendants for the medical services they provided to Sullivan. Plaintiff in this suit now seeks to recover from defendants the amounts it paid; that is, plaintiff wants the medical providers to ‘repay’ or ‘pay back’ or ‘refund’ the money plaintiff gave them for the care they provided to Sullivan. Plaintiff alleges that it has a right to repayment against defendants and in this suit it simply seeks to enforce that right to repayment against defendants. Notably, for the second and fourth count in its complaint, plaintiff actually uses the word ‘reimbursement’ to describe what it is seeking from the medical providers, which is the exact same word that is used in MCL 500.3175(3). Plaintiff does the same thing in its first question presented in this appeal, writing that the court barred its ‘claim seeking reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid on behalf of the claimant.’ … Finally, the term ‘third party’ is broad enough that it would appear to include the medical provider defendants who provided services to Sullivan and received from plaintiff payments for those services based upon Sullivan’s relationship to the assigned claims plaintiff. In any event, plaintiff has never argued that the medical providers are not ‘third parties’ as that term is used in MCL 500.3175(3).”
Therefore, because Citizens’ lawsuit was an action “to enforce rights to indemnity or reimbursement against a third party,” the Court of Appeals found it was subject to the limitations period in §3175(3). The Court concluded:
“[T]he trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendants and dismissing plaintiff’s claim on the ground that plaintiff did not bring its claim within the limitations period set forth in MCL 500.3175(3). For that same reason, plaintiff’s argument that the trial court should have granted it summary disposition and that it erred by not doing so is without merit. Plaintiff was not entitled to summary disposition because it did not bring its claim within the limitations period set forth in MCL 500.3175(3).”
