Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 329748; Unpublished
Judges Kelly, Stephens and O’Brien; Non-unanimous, Per Curiam (with Judge O’Brien dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion; Dissenting opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of/Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [§3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this non-unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion involving a plaintiff whose finger was injured as he exited a boat on a boat trailer, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits should not have been summarily dismissed because:
- plaintiff’s conduct of “alighting from” the boat by sliding down the boat’s side fell within the parked vehicle exception of MCL 500.3106(1)(c), and
- the boat trailer caused plaintiff’s injury, as required under MCL 500.3105(1), and its involvement was not “merely incidental, fortuitous, or but for.”
Plaintiff’s ring finger was seriously injured while he was exiting a boat on a boat trailer. Plaintiff filed a claim for PIP benefits with his no-fault insurer, defendant USAA, which denied the claim. Plaintiff then brought this action seeking benefits. During his deposition, plaintiff testified that he had towed the boat and boat trailer to a lake in order to launch it. He asserted that, when he arrived at the lake, he parked his vehicle and prepared to launch the boat. As part of the launching process, plaintiff testified he was on or in the boat, retrieved a plug for the boat and then slid down the side of the boat with the intent of retrieving a wrench from inside his vehicle. Plaintiff testified that, as he was sliding down the boat, his wedding ring caught a snap on the boat and was “ripped off.” Both plaintiff and USAA filed motions for summary disposition. The trial court granted USAA’s summary disposition motion. On appeal, plaintiff argued his conduct came within the parked vehicle exception in §3106(1)(c) because he was “alighting from” the vehicle (the boat trailer) when his injury occurred.
The Court of Appeals agreed with plaintiff’s argument and reversed summary disposition for USAA. The Court, in setting forth the test for determining whether PIP benefits were recoverable in connection with a parked vehicle, stated as follows:
“To be covered for an injury involving a parked vehicle, a claimant must establish the following:
(1) his conduct fits one of the three exceptions of subsection 3106(1); (2) the injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, and (3) the injury had a causal relationship to the parked motor vehicle that is more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for. [Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626, 635-636; 563 NW2d 683 (1997).]”
Applying this test, the Court first concluded that MCL 500.3106(1)(c) applied because plaintiff sustained injury will alighting from the boat on the trailer. In this regard, the Court said:
“Here, at the time [plaintiff] was injured, he was in mid-slide and his feet were not yet planted firmly on the ground. Thus, he was clearly alighting at the time he was injured. Further, although USAA argues that [plaintiff] was alighting from the boat, not the trailer, we do not find that fact dispositive. [Plaintiff’s] testimony shows that his intent was to alight from the trailer, retrieve a wrench from another vehicle, and walk around to the rear of the boat to continue preparing the boat for launch. Thus, when he alighted from the boat he was also alighting from the trailer. The trial court erred in finding that MCL 500.3106(1)(c) did not apply.”
Continuing with its application of the three-prong test, the Court of Appeals addressed whether plaintiff’s injury “arose out of” the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, as required by §3106(1). The Court noted that, to satisfy this requirement, the injury must be “closely related to the transportational function of automobiles.” Relying on McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 458 Mich 214 (1998), the Court stated:
“[Plaintiff] testified that he had towed the boat trailer to the lake so that he could launch it. While the trailer was moving, it was plainly being used for its transportational purpose, i.e., conveying objects over land. Further, the transportational function of a vehicle does not have a set beginning and a set end because, as recognized by the Supreme Court in McKenzie, the motor vehicle does not have to be in motion in order for an injury to arise from its transportational function. … [Plaintiff] testified that after arriving at the lake, he started preparing the boat for launch and that he intended to back the trailer up to the water in order to do so. Thus, it is clear that the transportational function of the trailer, conveying the boat over land to its end destination, had not yet ended when [plaintiff] was injured while alighting from the trailer. As a result, his use of the trailer was closely related to the transportational function of the trailer.”
The Court of Appeals also rejected USAA’s argument that plaintiff’s injury was not caused by the trailer. While plaintiff’s alighting from the boat by sliding down the side may have been “unorthodox,” it was not “unreasonable,” the Court said.
Lastly, the Court held that the involvement of the trailer was not “merely incidental, fortuitous, or but for.” According to the Court:
“Similarly, the involvement of the trailer in [plaintiff’s] injury was not merely incidental, fortuitous, or but for. Under the circumstances of this case, [plaintiff] was alighting from the boat while using it for its transportational function. Thus, like the plaintiff in Harris [v Grand Rapids Area Transit Authority, 153 Mich App 829 (1986)] who slipped on a plastic bag while alighting, and like the plaintiff in Krueger [v Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co, 112 Mich App 511 (1982)] who tripped on a pothole while alighting, there was a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the trailer’s character as a motor vehicle.”
In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals majority held that plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits.
Judge O’Brien dissented, saying that plaintiff’s injury “clearly was not” closely related to the vehicle’s transportational function. Citing McKenzie, the judge stated:
“Here, I agree that preparing to unload a boat represents an intended purpose of a boat trailer, but I cannot agree that preparing to unload a boat represents a transportational purpose of a boat trailer.”
