Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #s 339980; 339981; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Servitto, and Shapiro; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Replacement Service Expense Benefits: Nature of the Benefit [§3107(1)(c)]
Requirement that Benefits Were Unreasonably Delayed or Denied [§3148(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Medical Provider Standing Post-Covenant
Evidentiary Issues
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision involving consolidated appeals arising out of separate actions to recover unpaid no-fault PIP benefits, the Court of Appeals determined: (1) that the trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony did not materially affect defendant 21st Century Premier Insurance Company’s (Century) rights; (2) that plaintiff St. John Macomb-Oakland Hospital (St. John) was barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Covenant from bringing an action against Century; (3) that sufficient evidence was presented by plaintiff Tivon Humphries (Humphries) to prove that his wife did expect compensation for replacement services she provided; and (4) that Century’s refusal to pay PIP benefits was not unreasonable and that Humphries was therefore not entitled to attorney fees.
Humphries and St. John both initiated actions against Century to recover no-fault PIP benefits and replacement services benefits (Humphries only) for an automobile collision in which Humphries was injured and subsequently treated by St. John. The trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Century with regard to Humphries’s replacement services claim, and a jury verdict ultimately awarded judgments in favor of both Humphries and St. John and Century moved for a new trial, arguing that “its substantial rights were materially affected by the trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony.” The trial court denied Century’s motion for a new trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Century’s biomechanics expert from testifying to anything outside his field of expertise, nor did it abuse its discretion in allowing Humphries’s accident reconstructionist expert—who was limited in the same ways as Century’s biomechanics expert—to “render an expert opinion on how the accident at issue occurred and the potential force involved in the accident.”
Century further argued that an attorney for St. John’s engaged in attorney misconduct when he pointed out that the defendant’s biomechanics expert “never offered an opinion with respect to whether or not the disk injury was related to the accident,” even though the biomechanics expert had been instructed to refrain from doing just that. The Court determined, however, that “even if the brief comment was improper, any error was rendered harmless by the court’s instruction.”
The Court ultimately dispensed of St. John’s entire action, however, because St. John did not present evidence that it obtained a valid assignment from Humphries, and therefore had no standing to sue Century per the Supreme Court’s decision in Covenant. Even though the present action was commenced prior to the Covenant decision, Covenant applied retroactively, notwithstanding the fact that Century did not raise the issue of standing before the trial court.
In the Humphries action, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error in granting Century’s motion for a directed verdict as to Humphries’s claim for replacement services. Century did not allege that Humphries did not require replacement services after the accident, only that no evidence existed to prove that Humphries’s wife expected to be compensated for the replacement services she provided. The Court disagreed, finding:
In an October of 2016 joint pre-trial order, the parties stipulated to the admission of certain exhibits at trial, including replacement services proofs and defendant’s full and complete PIP file. These documents included ones where defendant’s wife filled out household services statements for the dates of July 25, 2014, through August 31, 2014. Then again for the month of October 2014 and for every month from November of 2014 through June of 2015. She also prepared an affidavit of household services on August 4, 2014, stating that she performed replacement services for Humphries from July 25, 2014, “through the present and ongoing.” The affidavit further states that “I am claiming $20 a day from July 25, 2014, through August 2014 and ongoing.”
Though Humphries’ wife did not testify at trial and Humphries testified only in general terms of what his wife did as far as services after he was injured, the documentary evidence established that Humphries’ wife performed replacement services for him and expected to be compensated for the same at a rate of $20.00 per day. Ultimately, the determination under the no-fault act of what is a reasonable charge is for the trier of fact. Bronson Methodist Hosp v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 295 Mich App 431, 454; 814 NW2d 670 (2012). The documentary evidence presented in the household services statements and the affidavit of Humphries’ wife was sufficient to allow the jury to adequately calculate the approximate amount of replacement services to which plaintiff was entitled. The trial court thus erred in granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict as to the replacement services.
The Court of Appeals also held that Humphries was not entitled to attorney fees, because Century’s withholding of no-fault PIP benefits was not unreasonable given the limited records that were provided to Century at the time Humphries filed his complaint.
