Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 341914; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Sawyer, and Redford; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals determined that Defendant MEEMIC Insurance Company was entitled to rescind Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy and refuse payment of no-fault PIP benefits because Plaintiff made a material misrepresentation as to the identity of her employer on her insurance application.
Plaintiff Erica Kelley applied for automobile insurance from MEEMIC after leaving her job as a hospital director and taking a new job at the Michigan Primary Care Association. On her application, however, she indicated that she was still employed by the hospital and that she fell within the limited class of professionals eligible for MEEMIC insurance. Kelley was injured in an automobile accident shortly thereafter, and MEEMIC refused to pay no-fault PIP benefits. In so refusing, MEEMIC asserted that Kelley had made a material misrepresentation regarding the identity of her employer and that she would not have been eligible for MEEMIC insurance based on her new employment. Her policy, MEEMIC argued, was therefore subject to rescission. Kelley then brought this action against MEEMIC, and the trial court granted summary disposition for MEEMIC, “because it found that plaintiff had made a ‘material misrepresentation’ on her insurance application and it did not find that plaintiff would have qualified for MEEMIC insurance even if plaintiff had disclosed her actual employer on her insurance application.”
The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for MEEMIC. On appeal, Kelley argued firstly that MEEMIC’s underwriting guidelines were ambiguous and were a part of her insurance policy, and should, therefore, be construed against MEEMIC. The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning:
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that plaintiff’s misrepresentation was a “material misrepresentation” because MEEMIC’s underwriting guidelines are ambiguous and provide “complete discretion” to MEEMIC’s underwriters to determine the eligibility of an applicant for MEEMIC insurance who does not fall within the nine “franchise groups.” Therefore, contends plaintiff, MEEMIC’s underwriting guidelines should be “construed against” MEEMIC. Plaintiff’s argument seemingly relies on an assumption that MEEMIC’s underwriting guidelines were part of the insurance policy it issued to plaintiff. However, as previously discussed, “ ‘[t]he policy application, declarations page of [the] policy, and the policy itself construed together constitute the contract.’ ” Dancey, 288 Mich App at 8, quoting Royal Prop Group, LLC, 267 Mich App at 715 (second alteration in original). Therefore, absent any indication otherwise, there is no reason to conclude that MEEMIC’s underwriting guidelines were part of plaintiff’s insurance policy.
Further, plaintiff does not provide any legal authority in support of her proposition that MEEMIC’s underwriting guidelines, which were not part of plaintiff’s insurance policy, might be construed in the same fashion as ambiguous language in a contract. “ ‘[W]here a party fails to cite any supporting legal authority for its position, the issue is deemed abandoned.’ ” Southfield Ed Ass’n v Bd of Ed of Southfield Pub Sch, 320 Mich App 353, 379; 909 NW2d 1 (2017), quoting Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999). Therefore, plaintiff has abandoned this argument on appeal.
Kelley argued secondly that her misrepresentation was not material because MEEMIC would have issued the same policy if she had listed her employer as the Michigan Primary Care Association, instead of the hospital. The Court again disagreed, finding that “plaintiff has not identified any evidence that MEEMIC would have issued her the same insurance policy if she had correctly identified her employer on her insurance application.”
Kelley argued thirdly that summary disposition should not have been granted because MEEMIC failed to provide a copy of its underwriting guidelines that were in effect at the time she submitted her application, and that MEEMIC, therefore, could not show that plaintiff would not have qualified for MEEMIC insurance based on her new employment at the Michigan Primary Care Association. The Court of Appeals determined that plaintiff did not properly preserve this argument and that it was therefore abandoned on appeal.
Kelley argued fourthly that MEEMIC could only rescind her policy if her material misrepresentation was made intentionally. The Court determined that Kelley did not properly preserve this issue either, but that even if she had, rescission would generally be available as an equitable remedy for innocent misrepresentation.
