Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 342445; Unpublished
Judges Letica, Ronayne Krause, and Boonstra; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
§500.3135 Tort Liability for Noneconomic and Economic Loss
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Motor Vehicle Code (Civil Liability of Owner) (MCL 257.401)
SUMMARY:
In this case, involving a wrongful death action, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s case, finding that a duty of care could not be imposed on the vehicle owner’s company because: (1) a special relationship did not exist between the decedent operator of the vehicle and the company for which the owner of the vehicle worked; (2) the company did not voluntarily assume an obligation that it was not required to undertake; (3) the owner was not acting as an agent of the company when he loaned the vehicle to decedent’s employer; and (4) foreseeability of an accident, alone, is insufficient to impose a duty on a defendant.
Mason Bolos was driving in the course of his employment at Marathon Auto Glass when he lost control of his vehicle and died in a single-car accident. He was driving with Revin Yousef, Marathon’s owner, at the time of the accident, and the vehicle he was driving was owned by Manoli Yousif, Revin’s uncle, who also owned the Revana Gas Station. Marathon was located inside of Revana, but both were separate businesses. Manoli let Revin use the vehicle for work purposes and changed the ball bearings and the serpentine belt at some point prior to the accident. The van, however, was bought for Manoli’s personal use and was only used by Revin for work purposes on occasion.
The Estate of Bolos filed a wrongful death action against Marathon and Revana, who moved for summary disposition. The trial court granted Marathon and Revana’s motion, citing “evidence that decedent was speeding at the time of the accident and the opinion of defendants’ expert that decedent ‘lost control of the van due to excessive speed and not because of any mechanical problems with the van.’” Moreover:
[P]laintiff did not demonstrate an issue of fact regarding the cause of the accident because plaintiff’s expert . . . acknowledged . . . that decedent was speeding. The trial court also determined that Revana owed no duty to decedent because it did not employ decedent, and there was no evidence that Revana was responsible for maintaining the vehicle or that negligent maintenance caused the accident.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s summary disposition order, first dispensed with plaintiff’s argument that there was a special relationship between Revana and Bolos, and that Revana, therefore, owed Bolos a duty of care. The Court pointed out that Revana did not own the van; Manoli, rather, owned the van personally. And Revana’s only connection to the van was when Manoli while working for Revana, repaired the van’s serpentine belt and the front right ball bearings. The Court reasoned:
Assuming Manoli was indeed acting in the scope of his employment with Revana when he made the repairs, any duty arising from those repairs would be limited to the work that was performed. Neither Manoli nor Revana had any further duty to ensure the tires or other mechanical components of the van were in a good condition. See Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 Mich 651, 665; 822 NW2d 190 (2012) (“[H]aving not undertaken by contract or otherwise to act on the gas line, [the defendants] had no duty to plaintiffs with respect to it.”). Further, decedent was employed by Marathon, not Revana. Therefore, Revana did not owe decedent a duty based on a special relationship.
Plaintiff also argued: (1) that a duty of care was created when Revana loaned Marathon the van, thereby assuming an obligation it was not required to undertake; (2) that since Manoli was a shareholder, and therefore an agent, of Revana, and since Manoli allowed the van to be used for Marathon’s business purposes, that Manoli’s actions can be imputed to Revana; (3) and that Bolos' death was a foreseeable result of unsafe tires.
As to the first argument, the Court pointed out, again, that Revana did not own the van, and therefore did not loan the van to Marathon. As to the second argument, the Court pointed out that a corporation and its shareholders are separate legal entities, and that “Manoli, as an individual, let Marathon use his personal van. This action was separate and distinct from Manoli’s involvement with Revana, and the act of lending the van to Marathon cannot be imputed to Revana.” As to the third argument, the Court reasoned that “foreseeability alone is insufficient to impose a duty on a defendant,” and that “the trial court [thus] did not err by concluding that Revana owed no duty of care to decedent.”
