Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 341407; Unpublished
Judges Jansen, Meter, and Gleicher; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Assignments of Benefits—Validity and Enforceability
SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam decision regarding assignments of benefits, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint because the anti-assignment clause in the plaintiff’s patient’s automobile insurance policy was unenforceable pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shah.
This case arises out of injuries sustained by Sherman Butler in an automobile accident. Butler received treatment from Plaintiff, and assigned to Plaintiff his rights to no-fault PIP benefits for any incurred charges relating to those treatments. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Butler’s automobile insurer, Defendant State Farm, seeking payment for treatments it provided. State Farm moved for summary disposition, invoking the anti-assignment clause in Butler’s policy, which the trial court granted.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for Defendant, finding that the anti-assignment clause in Butler’s policy was unenforceable pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shah. The Court argued:
Following the trial court’s order, this Court issued its opinion in Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182; 920 NW2d 148 (2018). In its brief on appeal, defendant acknowledges that the same anti-assignment clause at issue, in this case, was rendered unenforceable by the panel in Shah because it contravened our state’s longstanding public policy in support of the post-loss assignment of claims. See id. at 200. We agree with defendant that Shah is binding on this Court and requires us to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition. See MCR 7.215(C)(2).
Additionally, the Court declined “defendant’s invitation to declare a conflict with Shah,” because “[T]his Court’s decision in Shah was based on our Supreme Court’s decision in Roger Williams Ins Co v Carrington, 43 Mich 252, 254, 5 NW 303 (1880), in which our Supreme Court held that clauses barring the transfer of an accrued cause of action are absolutely unenforceable.”
